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of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
he convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber

o., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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Respe,ndent filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging, inter al.ia, that
her termination of employment with petitioner was predicated on gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The District Court found that the testimony for petitioner sufficiently
had rebutted respo!!dent's allegation of gender discrimination in the
decision to terminate her employment. The Court of Appeals reversed
this finding, holding that the defendant in a Title VII case bears the
burden e,f proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action and also
must prove by objective evidence that those hired were better qualified
than the plaintiff, and that the testimony for petitioner did not carry
either of these burdens.
Held: When the plaintiff in a Title VII case has proved a prima facie
case of empioyment discr..mination, the defendant bears only the burden
of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Pp.
4-11
(a) As set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792, the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof
in a Tit!e VII case, is as follows. First, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id., at
802. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the leg;timate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. The defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
I

'

-4

n

TEXAS DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE

NOTICE: Thts optnton ts subject to formal revtston before pubUcatton
tn the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary l)rint goes to press.

Syllabus
reasons, but it is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To
accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Pp. 4-6.
(b) The Court of Appeals erred by requiring petitioner to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating respondent. By doing this, the court required
much more than is required by McDonnell Douglas, supra, and its
progeny: it placed on petitioner the burden of persuading the court
that it had convincing, objective reasons for preferring the chosen
applicant above the respondent. Limiting the defendant's evidentiary
obligation to a burden of production will not unduly hinder the plaintiff. Pp. 7-9.
(c) The Court of Appeals a)so erred in requiring petitioner to prove
by objective evidence that the person hired was more qualified than
respondent. It is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly
situated employees were not treated equally, but the Court of Appeals'
rule would require the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective
qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected, and if it
cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has discriminated.
The Court of Appeals' views can also be read as requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person's
objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant.
But Title VII does not obligate an employer to accord this preference.
Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified
candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.
Pp. 9-10.
608 F. 2d 563, vacated and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1764
Texas Department of Community] On Writ of Certiorari to
Affairs, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Joyce Ann Burdine.
Circuit.
[March 4, 1981]
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address again the nature of the
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq. The narrow question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed.

I
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers.
When hired, respondent possessed several years' experience in
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months.
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-

~
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned
about inefficiencies at PSC.1 In February, 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller,
that it would terminate PSC the _following month. TDCA
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSC staff. 2
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired
a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired respondent along
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as
the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and
responsibility commensurate with what she would have received had she been appointed Project Director.
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court
held that neither decision was based on p;ender discrimination.
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Depart1
Among the problems identified were overstaffing, lack of fiscal control,
poor bookkeeping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lack
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40.
2
See id., at 39.

ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted
advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that
the three individuals terminated did not work well together,
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were
prompted by gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part.
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as
Project Director was better qualified for that position than
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's finding that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action and that the defendant also must
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay. 3
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the burden of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpretations of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals/
The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provision, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h), but that decision is not challenged here.
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980); Jackson v.
U. S. Steel Corp., 624 F. 2d 436 (CA3 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery
3
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we granted certiorari U. S. (1980). We now vacate
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the
correct standard.
II
In McDonnell Douglas Cnrp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory
treatment. 5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. ~
d, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id., at 802. Thirj , should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804.
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading ~
~ the trier of fact that the defendan(fntentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff.
~ Board of Trustees of K_eene State College v. Sw~eney: 439
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., d1ssentmg).
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the
burden of persuasion "never shifts"). The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to

-

County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980) ; Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 620 F. 2d 655 (CA8 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-276.
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Team&ters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1977).

5

bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff ~ ust ....,Erg,ve by a
proponderence of the evidence that she applie"d for an available position, for which she was gualified, but was rejected
under circl!!?stances which give rise to an inference of unl~wful discrimination. 6 The prima facie case serves an important
~ litigation: it eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n. 44 (1977).
As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,
438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only "because we presume these
ltct s, 1£ otne~se un explained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors." Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,

I
i

0

McDonnell Douglas, supra, we described an appropriate model for
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show:
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S.,
at 802.
We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t]he facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13.
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has
proved a prima facie case. She showed that she was a qualified woman
who sought an available position, but the position was left open for several
months before she finally was rejected in favor of a male who had been
under her supervision.

-~~
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no
issue of fact remains in the case. 1
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25.
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. 8 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. 9 The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc-

tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,10and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805.

6

The phrase "prima facie case" may denote not only the establishment
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumgtion, but also may be used by
courts to describe the pliinfiff's 'Eiurden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent
that in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former
sense.
8 This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden." F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255
(2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). See Fed. Rule Evid. 301. See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (3d Ed. 1940) . Cf. J . Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production helps the judge determine whether the
litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. In a
Title VII case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption
by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination.
9
An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.
1

(

I

III
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex,
the Court of Appeals adhered to two rules it had developed
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that

1

l

7

1

10 See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 (1898).
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination
arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence
and inferences· properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier
of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.
Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to
discredit the defendant's expalnation.

'i
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed.
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden,
the defendant "must prove that those he hired . . . were
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words,
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (emphasis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332,
339-340 (CA5 1975).

'

"'

A

The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what
he has done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id.,
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing,
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above
the plaintiff. 11
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the ground
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the
11 The
court reviewed the defendant's evidence and explained its
deficiency:
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning
Burdine and Walz. Fuller merely testified that he discharged and retained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the
position he was retained to do. Fuller failed to specify any objective
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain
Walz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the
program and that there had been some friction within the department that
might be alleviated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indicates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true comparison of the individuals hired and rejected." 608 F. 2d, at 568.

•

TEXAS DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE

9

burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But
this distinction slights .the rationale of Sweeney and of our
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not
been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals would require the defendant to introduce evidence
which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to
satisfy a burden of production.
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., supra, at 1255 (emphasis in original). We do not believe, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific.
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003,
1011-1012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case and from the requirement that
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit

11
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by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint.
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., U. S. (1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We
remain confident that the McDonnell Dougl,as framework
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.

B
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. McDonnell
Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate
that similarly situated employees were not treated equally.
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeals' rule would require
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected. If
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has
discriminated.
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error.
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions." McDonnel Dougl,as, supra, at 801. Title VII, however, does not
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 ( 1979). The statute was not intended to "diminish traditional management
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the number of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co.
v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577-578.

11

,,

The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person's objective qualifications were
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather,
the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the
employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2
1980).
IV
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had
superior objective qualifications for the position.12 When the
plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not reviewing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by
McDonnell DoWJlaa.
12
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(Wilkey, dissenting)

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
v.

LOUIS H. AIKENS

Federal/Civil

1. SUMMARY:

Timely

Did the CADC err in holding that a prima

facie case under Title VII is established when an employee shows
that he is a member of a minority group, applied for a promotion,
possessed the minimum qualifications for the position, but the
promotion went to someone else, not a member of a minority.
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2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Resp, a black retired

Postal Service employee, brought this suit in DCDC on Feb., 1977,
alleging that his employer had discriminated against him on the
basis of race by denying him certain details
violation of Title VII.

The trial court found

offered and refused several
1966 and 1974.

For

been

romotions

between
trial that he had
would "hate

to have to
division."

up o

ersonnel in order to take over a new

The trial judge found that the experiences resp might

have gained in the positions he refused would have given him a
considerable advantage in being considered for other positions.
Resp claimed that he was denied four promotions or
"details" between Jan. 17, 1973, and Jan. 12, 1974.

The trial judge

concluded that resp had

~

~

"produced no evidence that he was treated any differently
because of his race~ During the period in question, other
blacks as well as whites were promoted or detailed to
positions above resp. A black was selected for the
positlon of Postmaster of the District of Co1um5la in
,O~~
January, 19/~osition which plaintiff contends he was y-, · -not selected for because of his race.
~
"During the period covered by this complaint and
continuing to the present, there was a considerable
increase in the number of black emplo ees occupying high
leve positions in the 1s
o Columbia Post Office.
At the present time almost all high level positions are
held by blacks."

--

The trial court noted that resp had produced no "evidence
of specific acts of discrimination against him" @

"~hat resp

produced no credible evidence that he was as qualified or more
qualified than other individuals who were detailed or promoted above

3.
him."

The trial judge concluded that resp had failed to establish a

prima facie case.
Over Judge Wilkey's dissent, the CADC reversed, holding
that a Title VII pltf, establishing a Title VII case, need not show
that he is as qualified or more qualifed than the person actually
selected for a promotion.

Instead, a pltf need only show that (1)

he was a member of a minority; (2) he applied for, and was denied, a
promotion for which he was qualified; and (3) the promotion went to
someone who was not a minority.
The SG filed a petn for cert, requesting that the judgment
be vacated and the case remanded in light of Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

w..,(_

On June 29,~

1981, the Court (Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting) granted
the petn, vacated, and remanded in light of Burdine.

-

p'y(....I

~

On Sept. 8, 1981, in a per curiam, the CADC reaffirmed it
earlier holding, though it noted that the "minimum" qualifications
would not be sufficient if the employer indicated he preferred or
required additional qualifications.

The CADC remanded to the DC for

it to determine whether petr had the qualifications desired by the
employer (if so, a prima facie case had been established).
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG argues that the CADC's decision/

is inconsistent with this Court's decisions developing the prima
facie, including Burdine, and creates a split between the CADC and
the CA9 & CAlO.

The SG begins by noting that this Court first

considered the elements of a prima facie case under Title VII in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in which the
Court held that the pltf had successfully established a prima facie

~

4.

case by showing that he was a member of a class protected by Title
VII, that he had applied and was rejected for a job for which he was
qualified and for which the employer was seeking applicants, and
that the employer thereafter left the position unfilled while
continuing to seek applicants with the pltf's qualifications.

Id.,

at 802.
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. waters, 438

u.s.

567, 577

(1978), the Court explained the principle behind the McDonell
Douglas rule--in the situation described in McDonell Douglas, an
inference of discrimination may be drawn because "we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting."

And, as the Court noted in International

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977),
the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case depends upon
the particular context.
Next, the SG explains why he sought a remand on ~ ~

which held that the pltf's showing of a prima facie case shifts only ~
a burden of production, not proof, to the deft.

---------

In Burdine, the ·
1/

Court reaffirmed the rationale of McDonell Douglas and Furnco by
emphasizing that a Title VII pltf must establish a prima facie case,
not by invocation of a formalistic test, but by showing that he was
rejected "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
discrimination."

450 U.S., at 253.

The Court explained that such

~

evidence must be sufficient to "create[] a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee," id., at
254.

And the Court specified: "[i]f the trier of fact believes the

~~~~
c..---------pltf 's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because
no issue of fact remains in the case."

Ibid.

An accompanying

footnote explained that "[t]he phrase 'prima facie case'" is
intended in this context to "denote ••• the establishment of a
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption." Id., at 254 n.7.
The SG criticizes the CADC for mechcanically applying
prima facie case described in McDonell Douglas, E~ iring easy , in
~

which the employer continued to seek workers with the pltf's
qualifications after turning down the pltf, to a promotion

~~~;;_

L~~

on~ r
'vt..-

situation, in which an employer can give a promotion to only
a group of qualified employees.

The SG notes that the inference

~

that can be drawn from passing over a qualified applicant in the
McDonell Douglas situation simply cannot be drawn in the promotion

-situation.

By focusing entirely on whether McDonnell Douglas

requires a showing of minimal qualifications of equal or greater
lifications, the CADC failed to realize that the last prong of

the McDonnell Douglas test--turning an applicant away and continuing
~

to seek other applica~ with equivalent qualifications--is entirely
missing in the promotion situation, in which one person will be
selected from a pool of current employees who are qualified for the
position.

The SG argues that the resp has failed to show that he

was rejected under circumstances such that an inference can be made
that the rejection was motivated by discrimination, the standard
established by this Court in McDonnell Douglas, Furnco, and Burdine.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The CA5 agrees with the CADC.

See

Mcwilliams v. Escambia County School Bd, 658 F. 2d 326 (CA5 1981);

6•

Simon v. Honeywell, Inc., 642 F. 2d 754 (CA5 1981).
CAlO are to the contrary.

The CA9 and the

See Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F. 2d 622

(CA9), cert. denied, No. 81-41 (Oct. 5, 1981); Olson v. Philco Ford,
531 F. ed 474 (CAlO 1976).
This Court's decisions have repeatedly indicated that the
McDonell Douglas prima facie case is grounded on the reasonable
inference that can be drawn in the hiring situation described in
McDonell Douglas.

No similar inference can be drawn merely from the

fact that a minority member has been passed over in a situation in
which only one person can be promoted from a pool of qualified
employees.
Essentially for the reasons given by the SG, I recommend
calling for a response with an eye towards a grant.
01/19/82

Becker

Opin in petn
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

November 8, 1982

From: Rives

No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens

Question Presented
The issue is whether a prima facie case of employment
discrimination is made out by showing that an applicant was a member ~
of a protected minority, that jlhe applied for a promotion for which
;~

he was minimally qualified, that he was denied the promotion and

'

I• ~

',;

that a non-minority candidate was hired in his place.

~I.

Background.
The case arises in an unusual posture.

After resp put on

his case below, the DC refused the government's motion to dismiss
and directed the government to articulate its reason for refusing to
hire resp.

At the end of

which bear on the ultimate
discriminated against.

-...-------

DC made findings of fact
resp had been
[resp] has

One of these findings states ~

/j< 5

~

produced no credible evidence that he was as qualified or more

qualified than other individuals who were detailed [given temporary
assignments] or promoted during the period in question."
Pet. for Cert. 54a.

App. to

The DC concluded, however, that resp "has

failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination in
that [resp] failed to prove that he was as qualified or more
qualified than the individuals who were promoted or detailed."
to Pet. for Cert. 59a.

App.

It is odd that the DC would not have made a ~

finding after a full trial on the ultimate issue to be proved.
Although petr originally contended that the DC's finding that the
prima facie test had not been proved represented a conclusion on the
ultimate issue of discrimination, it has abandoned that contention.
See Gov't's Brief 5 n.3.
The DC's factual conclusion is also somewhat troubling.
During the trial, the DC ruled that it would not allow resp's

-----~

witnesses to compare resp's qualifications with the people who
received the jobs resp sought.

According to the DC, the only

---

credible evidence could come from supervisors who had worked with
both applicants.

-

impressive.

Additionally, resp's qualifications seem

-

He holds a Master's Degr ee and has progressed t

~~I
ards a

.J •

Ph.D.

~

At the time he sought the postal positions, he had a great

deal of seniority in the Post Office.

He had attended training

sessions and progressed through a number of levels in the service.
There is no indication that his work was unsatisfactory.

In 1968 he

was rated as "outstanding."
Of the four white supervisors who were given the jobs that

/
,t

resp sought, two did not finish high school.

One of the two who did

finish high school completed eight months of college.

Although petr

------::,,

may have had legitimate reasons for its choice, the DC's statement

' (_

\\

that resp offerred no credible evidence that he was as qualifi!;_9 as
the other applicants seems clearly erroneous on the basis of the
candidates' paper credentials.

If petr prevails on the issue r ai ~ ea

--,

h/.L

here, the case might be remanded to the CA to allow it to examine ~t,...t-

A

r

r~~

~~

~

the accuracy of the DC's fact finding.

~

e (r-

The first time that this case was appealed to the CA, the

held that to establish a prima facie test under Title VII a
plaintiff only had to show that: he belongs to a protected minority;
that he applied and was minimally qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; that despite his qualifications he
was rejected; and that the petition remained open.

The CA found

that the first, third and fourth critera were met.

The only

question was whether resp were qualified for the job he sought.
~

;

The

CA found that he was qualified (a point which the government

~ ~A~ concedes) and that the DC had erred in determining that resp had not

~~

established a prima facie case.

~

should be reversed for requiring resp to show that he was as

It noted alternatively that the DC

qualified or more qualified than the other applicants for the job.

Judge Wilkey dissented.

He reasoned that a court should

not apply McDonnell Douglas mechanically.

Showing that an applicant

was minimally qualified for a job does not necessarily raise an
inference of discrimination.

The more complex the job the less

likely it is that minimal qualifications would be sufficient to
raise a legally mandatory presumption that an employer had
discriminated against a minority applicant.

In choosing a person

for a supervisory position, the employer necessarily makes a
comparative decision.

In such a situation, the disgruntled

applicant should be required to show that he was as qualified as the
person who was hired.
The case lAJ~

-

GVR'd in light of Texas Department of
On remand, the CADC ~

- - - -.-

i4

kJ

In a per curiam decision for a up an1 ~ ~
panel, the CA essentially restated applicable law.

It then stated

in an apparent bow to Judge Wilkey's former position, "At the prima

c)}-f)G

facie stage, as noted above, the plaintiff may be required to go
'L

bey~ nd a sho~ ing of m~

th,,..,
~~-~

I•

m 3 ualifica_1 ions to demonstrat~ that he ---~--·

possesses whatever qualifications or background experi~ ces the
em~_Y er has indicate ~

II.

re imp~ tant."

App. to Pet. for Cert. Ba.

;

Discussion
The McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, standard for

I~
~

a prima facie case is well established, as are the second and third
stages of proof required by McDonnell.

The Court, however, has

never addressed directly the issue of what the prima facie test
requires.

~

In McDonnell Douglas, the ·Court listed the four part

Jo

test.

It stated, however, that the facts will vary with each Title

VII case and that the application of the prima facie test would vary
accordingly.
~

See 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.

eamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, shed further

light on the meaning of the prima facie case.

It recognized that

the standard was designed to place on the rejected applicant the

/J

burden of presenting evidence that would establish an inference of

,,

discrimination.

Teamsters noted that "an employer's isolated

decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a racial minority
does not show that the rejection was racially based."

Id., at 358

n.44. The McDonnell Douglas test requires that the applicant create
11
· f erence o f d 1scr1m1na
·
· · t 10n
·
"b' y sowing
h
·
th a t th e t wo mos t common
an 1n

reasons for rejecting an applicant were not present:

"an absolute

or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in
the job sought."

v

~

Ibid.

In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, the
Court restated the McDonnell test.

According to Furnco, McDonnell

made "clear that a Title VII plaintiff carries the burden of showing
actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such
actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that

,,

such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under

the Act."'

Id., at 576.

Finally i ~

the Court once again

explained the way in which a plaintiff may establish a le~ally
mandatory presumption
that shifts the burden of /L
pr_oduct1' on,~' but not

-

persuasion to the defendant.
decisions in the area.

In so doing, it reviewed the previous

Burdine did not, however, concentrate on

establishing a prima facie case.

In Burdine, as in previous cases,

that inquiry was not central to the task before the Court.
The preceding opinions indicate that the CA erred in
applying the McDonnell Douglas test mechanically.

The prima facie

test is, as Burdine indicated, a model which is not fixed but which
provides a general guide to be adapted to varying factual
situations.

'L

In determining the requirements for a prima facie case,

the previous cases indicate that two considerations should be kept
in mind.

First, the facts proved must be sufficient to establish an

inference of discrimination.

Second, the burden on a plaintiff at

the first stage should not be so onerous ~
rendered unnecessary.

Both sides to th ~

the third stage is

·;

argument fail to strike a

balance between these two pro~s ~ ions.
The SG's argument effectively would eliminate the third
stage envisioned by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.

The SG would

require a minority applicant to show as part of the prima facie case
that he was "more qualified" than the non-minority applicant chosen
for the job.

See Gov't's Brief at 22.

Alternatively, the SG would

require the minority applicant to show evidence of racially
discriminatory hiring practices and anecdotal evidence which woulg ;
indicate the possibility 6f racial bias.

Placing this burden on the

plaintiff at the initial stages would require essentially that he
anticipate the employer's response and offer evidence in advance
that the employer's decision was pretextual.
The SG's argument is based on the proposition that
discrimination in the workplace is no longer pervasive.

Thus, when

an employer chooses an equally qualified white applicant over an

equally qualified black applicant, there is no basis for inferring
that the employer's choice was racially motivated.

The SG's

argument is extremely plausible with respect to the ultimate
determination to be made.

See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259.

The

initial burden it places on a Title VII plaintiff is, however,
inconsistent with the congressional findings on discrimination.

The

resp argues persuasively that in amending the Civil Rights Act in

--

1972, Congress took notice of the pervasive nature of
discrimination.

To require that a plaintiff establish, as part of
I

l

v\

his prima facie case, that he was more qualified than other
/

applicants undercuts Congress' assessment~

Moreover, the SG's

position is inconsistent with Teamsters' recognition that a prima
facie case could be made by showing that there was no "relative lack
of qualifications."
It does not seem that allowing an applicant to establish a
prima facie case by showing that he is as qualified as the other
applicants will increase the burden on the employer in a significant
respect.

Most frequently employer-defendants move for involuntary

dismissal, under Rule 4l(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to
establish a prima facie case at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence.

,,

The employer thus will already have been put to the

expense and trouble of going to trial.

Making the prima facie case

more difficult to establish might discourage litigants from bringing ~
frivolous Title VII suits in the first instance.

It would seem,

however, that this disincentive is already built into the system
since the applicant retains the ultimate burden of persuasion and
-...)

the employer has only to articulate a legitimate reason to carry its

burden of production.

Moreover, courts may ~ s attorney's fees

against litigants who bring frivolous suits.

Although this

provision may not be exercised frequently, it does provide employers
with some protection against such suits.
The government's position is too extreme as it would
result in a substantial modification of the McDonnell Douglas
by collapsing the first and third prongs of the test.
Correspondingly, the petr's position, and that of the CA's, impos
too little a burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case.

The second factor in the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test

is that the applicant was qualified for the job for which the
employer was seeking applicants.

Teamsters, supra, at 358 n.44,

I.,

indicated that if there were a relative lack of qualifications one
of the most common reasons for not hiring an applicant would remain.
Thus, the Title VII plaintiff, who demonstrated that he was
minimally qualified,

would not have adduced evidence that would

raise an inference of discrimination.

The mere failure to hire a

minority candidate is not sufficient by itself to raise such an
inference.

-----...

The two primary reasons for allowing an applicant to
establish a prima facie case by showing that he was minimally
qualified are that it promotes the congressional goal of eliminating
discrimination and that it allows the plaintiff a way of procuring
evidence that would be hard to obtain during discovery.
these arguments offers, however, a basis for reducing the
plaintiff's initial burden.

Neither of

J

•

With respect to the first argument, Congress goal was to
eliminate discrimination.

It would contravene that goal to adopt a

test that allowed a plaintiff to present evidence that was
insufficient to raise a legally mandatory presumption of
discrimination >

When the plaintiff cannot show that he was as

qualified as the applicant who received the job there is simply no
reason to presume that discrimination was the basis for the
employer's rejection.
The second argument made by Title VII plaintiffs is that
requiring a plaintiff to show only that he is minimally qualified is
desireable since it places the burden of production on the party who
has the evidence.

Requiring the plaintiff to show that he is as

qualified as the successful candidate would make him responsible for
proving facts that he cannot obtain.
proposition is two fold.

The difficulty with this

First, the purpose of requiring the

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is to
frame the issues so that the plaintiff will be able to show, at the
third stage, that such reasons are pretextual.

The~

Donnell

Douglas allocation of burdens does not contemplate that the employer

--------------

will be a source of evidence helpful to the plaintiff.

'---

.....

Although

;

employers often offer such evidence at the second stage of the
proceeding, nothing requires them to do so.

Indeed, it would seem

to be poor trial strategy for a Title VII to wait until the middle
of trial to find out what the employer's evidence is going to be.
If the employee has not already engaged in discovery prior to trial,
he will be in a poor position to show that the employer's reasons
are pretextual when the trial reaches that stage.

-----

Thus, it would

-LV

o

seem that the discovery rationale is inconsistent with the
preparation that a responsible litigant would take.
The second difficulty with this argument is that it
presumes that discovery is inadequate.

If an employer is not

forthcoming with information, the applicant can always seek
sanctions against the employer.

Alternatively, a DC might consider

the employer's failure to release information in determining whether
the employee had made out a prima facie case.

Absent some showing

that discovery is ineffective, there seems to be little reason to
structure the prima facie test to aid Title VII plaintiffs in this
manner.

Conclusion

government and resp's position.
prima facie case should be

seeks to prove a
to establish facts that raise an

.,,

show that he was as
such an inference.
In situations

are

minimally qualified would also be as qualified to do the job as the
person hired.

Where the job is more complex, there is a greater

variance between the skills sought and greater need to go beyond
minimal qualifications to raise an inference of discrimination.

~
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[December - , 1982]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service, discriminated against him on account of his race.
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in
the Washington, D.C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 642 F. 2d 514
(CA DC 1980). We vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in the light of
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof
of discriminatory intent. 665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CA DC 1981)
(Per Curiam). We granted certiorari to consider the assessment of proof of racial discrimination when an employer has
selected among applicants for a higher managerial position 1•
- u. s. - (1982).
We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate
impact on minority applicants. See, e. g., Texas Department of Com mu1
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The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent 2, but also that it erred in
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who
were promoted. The Postal Service insists that an employee
who has showed only that he was black, that he had applied
for a promotion for which he possessed the~ inimum qualifications,~1nd that the Postal Service selected a non-minority
applicant has not established a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination under Title VII.
Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the District Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case. Indeed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court in
January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been
disposed of in a relatively short span of time (according to judicial lights) with the District Court making the necessary essential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under
the appropriate standard 3 • But we take the case as it comes
to us.
We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Doug-

---

nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, n. 14 (1973).
2
As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, n. 44
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination.")
U. S . - , (1982).
' See Pullman Standard v. Swint, -
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las v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1972), reveal a rp.isunders~ ding
of that line of cases. Because this misunderstanding may
have been shared in part by the District Court and by the
Court of Appeals in the present case, we take the libei:_ty of
setting forth the facts as well as the law in the p:rfncipal cases
in tlie M c15onnell-Douglas line.
-.
In M dJoii/iie[l-Dou glas itself, the defendant employer ran
a newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics.
The plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by
the defendant, applied for reemployment. The defendant
declined to rehire him, even though it continued to hire other
applicants who responded to the advertisement after the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the
District Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. That court held that the reason given by the
defendant for refusing to rehire plaintiff-plaintiff's participation in a "stall in" and "lock-in" at defendant's place of business-was a "subjective" criterion that carried little weight
in rebutting charges of discrimination. The Court of Appeals set forth its version of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.
Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima
facie case:
"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id., at 802.

We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of

81-1044-0PINION
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the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13.
We returned to the same question in.E,urt,ico Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978). The employer's business was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with
"fire brick." The employer did not maintain a permanent
force of bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for
each project, and then delegated to him the task of securing a
competent work force. The superintendent who declined to
hire the plaintiff did not accept applications at the job site,
but hired only persons he knew to be experienced and competent in this work or who had been recommended to him as
similarly skilled. The employer claimed this policy was established to ensure that only experienced and highly qualified
fire bricklayers were employed, because untimely work could
result in substantial losses both to the steel mill operator and
to the contractor-employer. Id., at 569-572.
We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. We disagreed, however, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's
hiring practices were illegitimate.
In discussing the
showings required of the parties to Title VII suits, we
pointed out:
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is
always whether the employer is treating 'some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.' Int'l. Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, supra,[431 U. S.,] at 335, n.
15. The method suggested in McDonnell-Douglas for
pursuing this mqmry, owever, was never intended to
be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely
a sens1 e, or erly way to eva uate the evidence in light
of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." 438 U. S., at 577.

)Y
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Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed
fiiat'tlie employer's failure to promote her and its later decision to terminate her had both resulted from gender-based
discrimination. The District Court found after a bench trial
that neither decision was discriminatory. Id., at 251. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of
the District Court as to the promotion, but reversed its finding on the termination.
We reviewed only the part of the case that had been reversed by the Court of Appeals, and stated more clearly the
conse uences of the plaintiffs success in making the showing
require~b~ ~
nel_ Douglas. The prima acie case in a
Title V action is not merely the minimum showing that will
justify a verdict for the plaintiff, it "creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Id., at 254, n. 7. If the employer does not rebut
this presumption by "clearly set[ting] forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action, id., at 255, the district court
"must enter judgment for the plaintiff." Id., at 254 (emphasis supplied).
The justification for this seemingly drastic rule can be
found in Furnco:
"A prima facie case under McDonnell-Douglas raises
an inference of discrimination only because we presu~
these acts, if otherwise explained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.
. . . And we are willing to presume this largely because
we know that from our experience that more often than
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant had been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the em-

I

?

?

-£:::-
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ployer, whom we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." 438 U. S., at 567.
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the
most common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection." Burdine, supra, at 254. For this reason, we /
have held that an unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently
trJ<
compelling to require a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter
of law.
In the present case, both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases. We disagree. The first and third elements ~
of McDonnell-Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens belongs to a racial minority, and he applied for the promotions
in question but was denied them. The fourth element, however, is entirely absent; the position did not remain open, as
it did in McDonnell-Douglas, but was filled by the applicant
chosen in preference to Aikens. Indeed, where an employer
seeks to fill a single managerial position, the position will by
definition not be open after one of the applicants has been
chosen.
The second McDonnell-Douglas element-the showing
that thepi°ii"intiff was "qualified" for fneTob--is more problematic. There is no cfoubtthat Aikens had an impressive
resume. He has a Masters Degree and has completed three
years of residence towards a Ph.D. He has been rated as
"an outstanding supervisor whose management abilities are
far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more
supervisory seniority and training and development courses
than all but one of the white persons who were promoted
above him. It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient, '-1.,£--L..1
in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious
r
consideration.

----
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At this point, however, agreement between the parties,
and between the courts that have considered this factual issue, breaks down. It is argued that Aikens must show he is
"as qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better qualified" than the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified,"
or merely "qualified" for the jobs he sought. We believe
that this contest of comparatives ultimately proves selfstultifying.
The fair reading of the McDonnell-Douglas advertisement
for qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably
objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic,
and that applicants would be hired on a first come, first
served basis until the employer had obtained the number of
mechanics it needed. But where one managerial position is
open, there may be no totally objective measure of who.,is
1'g"'ualified," and the employer certamly does not undertake to
promote more than one applicant. Employers consider a
~ ge ~
O:r:§., such as each applicant's understanding
o
e organizat10n's goals, ability to work effectively with
particular superiors and subordinates, maturity, originality,
initiative, and decision making ability. It will rarely, if ever,
be possible to quanitfy all the relevant criteria and tally them
up on a score card.
In these circumstances, the question is not whether we ~ 11
"foll w" the M Donnell-Douglas Ime of cases, but whether
the mc1ples established m ose cases were ever meant to
applyT o a situation so far removed from their factual context.
If those principles do not provid-e-the district courts with a
"sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience," Furnco, supra, at 577, they are inagplicable under the terms of those decisions. Burdine, supra,
at~ n. 6; Furnco, supra, at 575-576; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358
(1977); McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13.
McDonnell-Douglas and Furnco both dealt with entry

"i~R
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level jobs, one in a large manufacturing industry and the
other in the construction industry. In those cases, if the
plaintiff could meet the four elements of the McDonnellDouglas prima facie case-that he belonged to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants, that he was rejected,
and that after his rejection the employer continued to seek
similarly qualified applicants-the plaintiff has in effect negatived the principal broadly applicable reasons that would
show that the employer's refusal to hire him was not based on
a discriminatory animus.
But that simply is not true in the present case. There
were several applicants for each position, and only one could
be chosen. The "qualifications" for the position as laid down
by the Postal Service, while not appearing as clearly from the
record as might be, were by no means as easy to assess as the
qualifications for a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnellDouglas. We sim 1 do not think that Aikens' showin that
h~
ck, th~t he was ufficient y gua 1 e to be seriously
considered, and...th at ~ was I!gt ch.Q_sen, "eliminates the most
common non-discriminatory reasons" for his rejection.
Burdine, supra, at 254 (emphasis supplied).
Were we to attempt' fo revise~the McDonnell-Dougjg,s case
to fit the facts of Afkens' case, we would be obliged to hold
that Aikens, merely by showing he was a member of a minored for a vacancy, and that the Postal
ity, tha~
Service promoted another of several applicants for the single
vacancy, judgment should be entered for Aikens in the absence of any rebutting evidence on the part of the Postal Service. This we are unwilling to do; such a showing in these
circumstances does not justify-the presu:m.~tion thatJlle employer's acts "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."
Furnco, supra, at 577.
Although Aikens' showing does not justify a p ~

/
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of discrimination, it is sufficient to support an inference of
di$crimi9ation. ThafTs;1f the District Court were to conc l ~ the Postal Service did treat Aikens less favorably
than others because of his race, we surely could not say, on
the basis of the record before us, that such a finding would be
clearly erroneous. Aikens showed that white persons were
consistently promoted and detailed over him and all other
black persons between 1966 and 1974. Aikens had substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced ahead of him; of the 12, only 2 had any education beyond high school and none had a college degree. Aikens
introduced testimony at trial that the person responsible for
the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in
particular.
We believe that the District Court, which is able to perceive the attitude and demeanor of witnesses, and to evaluate
their credibility and the weight that should be placed on their
testimony, is in a far better position than this Court to decide
whether the Postal Service discriminated againt Aikens.
The District Court should decide this case in the same manner as it decides questions of fact in the myriad other kinds of
litigation before it.
We therefore hold that in a case such as this, where no
standardized prima facie case can be made out, the district
court should evaluate all the admissible evidence and then decide the factual question of discrimination. Thus, plaintiffs
may seek to obtain the benefit of the B~dine.. presu~ticm by
making out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, and may
also seek to prove their case in the ordinary way 4 • Of
• A rough analogy may be found in the law relating to res ipsa loquitur
In some circumstances a showing of circumstances
sufficient to raise res ipsa creates a rebuttable presumption like the
Burdine presumption. See Prosser, Torts 229-230 (1971). A tort plaintiff can seek to show negligence directly without abandoning the benefit of
in negligence actions.
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course, a plaintiff who fails to make out a McDonnell Douglas
primafacie case will not survive a motion for judgment at the
close of his case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) unless he has
presented evidence from which the district court can infer
that he was discriminated against. See Teamsters, supra, at
358. This case presents one example of that sort of
evidence.
All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult.
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. In
any Title VII case, regardless whether the prima facie case
device is available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is
"whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters,
supra, at 335, n. 15). There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes, but this does
not mean that courts should treat the question of discrimination differently from other questions of fact. The law often
obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind.
As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice , 29 Ch. Div.
459, 483 (1885).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the
case is remanded with directions to remand to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
res ipsa.

Id., at 231-232.

drk 12/09/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1044, U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

I do not disagree with the basic idea behind Justice
Rehnquist's opinion but I find it troubling for its lack of clarity.
My first problem is that he rejects the application of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie test to the situation presented in this case
because proof of its factors does not eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's rejection.
does not make clear, however, what those reasons are.
reasons are suggested.

See pages 7-8.

The opinion
Two different

The first is that McDonnell

Douglas does not apply because the considerations in hiring a white
collar worker are less easily quantifiable than those involved in
hiring factory workers.

The second is that this case involves a

promotion, in which the job is filled, rather than a situation in
which the job is kept open after the Title VII plaintiff is
rejected.

Because the opinion does not make clear why it finds the

McDonnell Douglas prima facie test inapplicable, it leaves it
unclear when it should be applied or whether DC's, in most
situations, should look at the facts of each case to determine
whether there is an inference of discrimination.

I do not think

that the latter choice is inconsistent with McDonnell Douglas's

2.

recognition that its application will vary with the facts of each
case.

It seems, however, that the opinion should give the lower

courts some guidance on this point.
My second problem is that I do not understand the
distinction that the opinion draws between presumptions and
inferences.

See pages 8-9.

I had understood Burdine as stating

that the McDonnell Douglas test raises an inference of
discrimination and that that is sufficient to create a legally
mandatory rebuttable presumption.

If Aikens' facts are sufficient

to support an inference of discrimination, I do not understand why
that would not result in a rebuttable presumption.

The opinion

appears to draw a distinction between the two situations and the
method of proof in each.

If a plaintiff can establish the McDonnell

Douglas prima facie test, then the McDonnell Douglas shift of the
burden of production to the employer is applicable.

If a plaintiff

cannot establish a prima facie test under McDonnell Douglas, the
opinion suggests that he then should establish an inference of
discrimination and a more traditional approach is applicable.

If I
;

am reading the opinion correctly, this seems to be a fairly radical
change.

Although I am unsure of your position on this matter, I

would have some reservations about joining the opinion until it was
clearer what it was doing and the extent to which it limited
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.
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CHAMBERS OF

-JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 9, 1982

Re:

No. 81-1044 - United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens

Dear Bill:
In due course I hope to circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

,,

.§uprttm

C!Jitttrl of t1ft~ttb .§hrltS'

..ltS'!pn:ghm. ~. C!J. 2.0.;i'!'
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 9, 1982

Re:

81-1044 - United States Postal Service
v. Aikens

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

;

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.:§u:p-umt QJo-url of tqt ~tb j;taft.S'

~fyht.gto-n.~.QJ.
CHAMBERS

20ffe~~

or

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 15, 1982

Re:

81-1044 - United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens

Dear Bili",

I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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jilufrittghm, 1J. (!J. 2ilffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST
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December 15, 1982

:,~~~~
Re:

No. 81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

Dear Lewis:
After reading your letter of today's date, and then
talking to you on the phone about it, I have a feeling that
little, if anything, separates us in our view of this case.
You said in your letter, and also on the phone, that
you are primarily troubled by my reading of Burdine. When I
joined your opinion in McDonnell-Douglas I had no idea that
the Court was talking about anything other than the normal
"inference" of one fact that a trier of fact draws from
other facts which will support the inference. And, as you
said on the phone, I am not sure that I knew of any very
precise distinction between an "inference" and a
"presumption." To the extent that there is any of the kind
of tension you refer to in your letter between the
"inference analysis" and the "presumption analysis," I think
it comes from your footnote 7 in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
There the Court clearly states that it is n..o t merely an
inferen£e, but a "legally mandatory, rebut ta ble presumption"
wn"i ch arises from the plaintiff's proving his prima facie
case under McDonnell-Douglas. I confess I paid no attention
to the footnote when I joined your opinion, and I also
confess that I wish the footnote weren't there. But it is,
and as we agreed on the phone I don't think the difference
between a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," and
an "inference" makes much difference in the great majority
of garden variety employment discrimination cases in which a
plaintiff will try to establish the four elements described
in McDonnell-Douglas.
Where it would make a difference is in a case like
this, where at least one and probably two of the McDonnellDouglas elements are not present. In this sort of a case,

'.

-

2 -

if we were to bob-tail McDonnell-Douglas, and say that even
though only two of the four McDonnell-Douglas elements are
present, nonetheless a "legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption" arises, I think the point the government makes
in their brief is well taken: for a member of a minority
group to simply show that he was one of several considered
for a promotion to a managerial job, and that a non-minority
applicant was chosen in preference to him, should not
without more give rise to a presumption of discrimination.
This conviction is what led me to write the opinion the
way I hope I did: to leave the four element test of
McDonnell-Douglas absolutely in~tact, and doubtless
governing 95% of the employment""discrimination litigation in
this country. But when the plaintiff is unable to prove two
of the elements of McDonnell-Douglas, as this plaintiff was,
I think it would be a great mistake to try to "bob-tail"
McDonnell-Douglas and create a new type of "legally
mandatory rebuttable presumption" into which his case might
fit. I think it much better to say that where the four
elements of the McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case can't be
made out, the plaintiff is simply remitted to proving
discrimination the way one proves any other factual element
in a disputed lawsuit. Triers of fact are still permitted
to draw reasonable inference from the facts adduced by the
parties, and the decision of the trier of fact will be
affirmed unless a Court of Appeals thinks it is clearly
erroneous.

.. ~:i ...
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This is by no means to say that McDonnell-Douglas
"doesn't apply" or isn't a "starting point": it is simply to
say that when one begins with McDonnell-Douglas and finds
that one or more of the four elements required by that
decision for the plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking,
one may not have the benefit of the rebuttable presumption
flowing from the prima facie case. This is not a rejection
of McDonnell-Douglas, but an applicatio~ of it.
~

I realize from your letter and our telephone
conversation that the opinion does not say all this quite as
clearly as I would like it to.
If it would accommodate the concern which you expressed
in your letter, I would like to insert the following
separate paragraph before the first full paragraph beginning
on page 10 of the first draft: "McDonnell-Douglas thus
remains the starting point for all Title VII employment
discrimination case trials. In the great majority of Title
VII cases, either the plaintiff will be able to make out the

'/

...

~
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four elements of the prima facie case described in
McDonnell-Douglas, or will have no alternative method of
proving the necessary factual allegations to support a
recovery. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff does not
make out a McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case, but can
present 'enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to
infer' that the defendant has engaged in illegal
discrimination, Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 7, the trier of
fact should permit the plaintiff to proceed as with all
other contested factual issues, and of course without the
benefit of the presumption described in Burdine."
Sincerely,

(/lW
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Justice Powell
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Dec~mber 15, 1982
81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens
DPar Bill:

..

;\v
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I agree that the ~cnonnell-nouglas prima facie
test does not apply to the situation presented in this case.
ThP fourth element (the position remains open) is absent in
every case where only a single position is being filled.
·
The McDonnell-Douglas second element (the applicant was qualified) also Rhou1d not apply literally where
only a single position is at issue. As you state, in a case
such as the present one, there may be a number of appttcant~
who fairly can be viewed as "qualified". It is essential,
from management's viewpoint, that the best qualified person
be selected. The initial burden on a Title VII claimant
shoulo be to show that he wag at lea~t a~ "wP11 qualified"
as any other applicant. Your opinion generally is consistent with the foregoing, althouqh I think we should retain
McDonnell-Douglas as the starting point in these cases.

i

",,,

·•

t Rm troubled -pri.marilv by your ·reading of ·
,,,.
Burdine. My opinion in that case stated that ,.,hen the ,_ic- ,/'
Donnel test is met, it creates an inference of discr.imina- ·
tion. When the facts proved by a plaintiff are sufficient
to support such an inference, Ruro'ne said this would result
ln a rebuttable presumption. Your opinion, as I understand
it, suqgests some tension between the inferencP analysis and
a pr.esumpt ion. In my view, the facts must be adequate to __ 1
justify an inference of aiscrimination. In that event, a
~·~
rebuttable presumption existA and the burden of goinq forward shifts to the employer.. The ultimate bur.rlen of persua-'
sion remains, of course, on the plaintiff..
,{'

Perhaps I didn't make this clear in Burdine, al- , ;
though th is was my unnerstann ing of it at thP. t 1me. I wou l r1 '
hesitate to ioin a different understnna ing now, as it seems · , ;;
to me this would create more than a little confusion.
'
Sincerelv,
-~

1:f.p/ss
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1044, U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

Justice Rehnquist's opinion states that whenever a
plaintiff's case does not fit precisely within the McDonnell
Douglas mold the three stage procedure is inapplicable.

His

letter states that the effect of his opinion will be minimal
since 95% of employment discrimination will fit this pattern.
Only those cases that involve promotion will fall outside the
pattern and be dealt with under the regular two step procedure.
The primary question I have is the extent to which his opinion
will limit the application of McDonnell Douglas.
I would not have guessed that only 5% of the Title VII
cases involve promotion.

Nor would I have thought that the

remainder of the cases fit precisely the McDonnell Douglas
pattern.

As McDonnell Douglas recognizes, each case will involve

differing facts.

To the extent that a plaintiff's case does not

fit precisely within the pattern, it seems Justice Rehnquist's
opinion could be read as saying that McDonnell Douglas is
inapplicable.

Or to the extent a plaintiff attempts to offer

additional evidence at the initial stage of the trial, his case
would appear to fall outside of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2.
Thus, there is a risk that trial judges either will abandon
McDonnell Douglas in a large number of cases or try to
incorporate the two schemes in one trial.
Although I think the paragraph proposed in Justice
Rehnquist's letter reaffirms the McDonnell Douglas test verbally,
I am less clear that it would resolve the tension that underlies
his opinion.

It seems to me the simplest way to resolve the

tension is to get rid of the inference/presumption distinction.
His opinion could state that in promotion cases the traditional
McDonnell Douglas criteria do not apply strictly.

The question

of whether the plaintiff has established an inference of
discrimination {and thereby a legally, mandatory rebuttable
presumption) will be left to the trier of fact, who will be
guided by the criteria listed in McDonnell Douglas.

The employer

could then come back and rebut the presumption, as he now can, by
articulating a legitimate business reason.

The plaintiff may

choose to rest on his prima facie case as proof that the
employer's reason is pretextual or he may offer additional proof
in response to the reason given by the employer.

This is just a

~

suggestion but it may accomodate Justice Rehnquist's concerns
{although I have my doubts) and preserve McDonnell Douglas.
My analysis may easily be faulty. The opinion may have only a
limited effect and the proposed paragraph more than sufficient to
limit the damage.

I am not sure, however, that that is the case.

Nor is it clear to me that the opinion can be limited easily as
long as the inference/presumption distinction remains.

~I~

.•

~

j~/~·
,f;o ~

/./
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December 20,

1982

u.s. Postal Service v. Aikens

Dear Bi11:
I am afraid we are farther apar.t than I had supposed. I have reread your opinion, as well as McDonnellDouglas and Burdine.
For me, the principal negative with your opinion
is the way it distinguishes McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine.
It can be read as creating an entirely new anaylsis applicable to promotions. I see no necessity for doing this, and I
am afraid that your opinion would invite courts to depart
from what has become a familiar mode of analysis in these
cases.
Your concern over fn. 7 in Burdine puzzles me.
The text of Burdine repeatedly refers to the rebuttable presumption. s~e, e.g., pp. 254, 255. The role of the presumption is describeo more fully in fn. 8 and 10. In the
former, we state that the relationship between nthe presumption created by a prima facie case and the consequential
burden of production placed on the defendant is a traditional feature of the common law", and that the term "presumption" properly used "refers only to a device for allocating
the production burden".
In what respect would your preference for using
only the term "inferencen differ in result? Surely, under
McDonnell-Douglas, Furnco and Burdine, when a prima facie
case is made the burden of production - and only that burden
- shifts to the defendant.
I think this case could be written in a straightforward manner by starting as you do (p. 3, 4) with the
statement in McDonnell-Douglas that the facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases and "the specifications {set
forth in McDonnell-Douglas for] the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differeing factual situations". Then, as
your opinion does, point out the factual distinction between

2.

a promotion case and the employment situation involved in
McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine. In a case such as this where
only a single executive position is to be filled, the elements of a prima facie case - in addition to the applicable
ones of McDonnell-Douglas - include a showing that the
plaintiff is at least as well qualified as the person who
was given the promotion. I like your discussion of factors
to be considered in determining whether the plaintiff in a
promotion case was at least as well qualified.
In addition, where - as in this case - there may
have been several candidates equally well qualified, lt
would not be inappropriate to require some evidence of discriminatory intent other than the fact that the plaintiff
was not chosen. In making judgments to fill high executive
positions, subjective considerations customarily enter into
the decisions. ~here may be two candidates whose education
and experience appear to qualify them both equally well. A
judgment rationally could be made in favor of one with no
intent whatever to discriminate against the other.

If there is a discriminatory intent, there usually
will be some evidence of it. As your opinion notes, there
was abundant evin~nce here to create a stronq inference of
discrimination. All of our cases have required a showing
sufficient to create such an inference.
I regret creating a problem for you, but as the
author of McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine I simply cannot
agree to an opinion that seems to me to unsettle a good deal
of what I thlnk we have accomplished by those decisions. If
you think it inadvisable to revise your opinion substantially along the above linee (and I would, of course, fully understand if you decline to do so), I will circulate these
views to the Conference.

Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

lfp/ss 12/30/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Rehnquist

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 29, 1982

81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens
You suggested that I indicate specifically why I
am hesitant to join your opinion.

I am with you, of course,

through the first four pages.
My difficulty commences with the second full paragraph on page 5.

There, you emphasize primarily a part of

what was said in Burdine about a presumption being created
by a prima facie case.

I agree that a "presumption" and

"inference" do not necessarily have the same consequences.
But Burdine defines the consequences in cases of this kind.
The two are used in conjunction:

once a prima facie case is

established, a rebuttable presumption arises.
only footnote 7.

You mention

Actually, the text of Burdine repeatedly

refers to the presumption.

See, e.g., pp. 254, 255.

role is described more fully in fn. 8 and 10.

Its

In the for-

mer, we state the relationship between the presumption and
the prima facie case, and also expressly state that the term
"presumption" properly used "refers only to a device for
allocation of the production burden".

Also, you used the

word "presume" in Furnco in substantially the same sense:

a

result from the establishment of a prima facie case.
I am afraid substantial confusion will result from
the way this paragraph is now written.

And, certainly, I

2.

would not describe our precedents as creating a "seemingly
drastic rule".
If you revise page 5 substantially along the above
lines, possibly some conforming changes would have to be
made in the first two sentences (beginning "More succinctly
phrased . . • ) of your text on page 6.
I have no difficulty with the two full paragraphs
on page 6, but again become uneasy with what you seem to say
primarily on pages 7 and 8.

As I read your opinion, you

- reject the principles of the prior cases as being wholly
inapplicable to a promotion case.

This seems unnecessary.

This case could be written in a straightforward
manner by starting, as you do (p. 3,4), with the statement
in McDonnell-Douglas that the facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases and "the specifications [set forth in
McDonnell-Douglas for]

the prima facie proof required from

respondent are not necessarily applicable in every respect
to differing factual situations".

Then, as your opinion

does, point out the factual distinction between a promotion
case and the employment situations involved in McDonnellDouglas and Burdine.

In a case such as this, where only a

single executive positon is to be filled, the elements of a
prima facie case McDonnell-Douglas -

in addition to the applicable ones of
include a showing that the plaintiff is

at least as well qualified as the person who was given the
promotion.

3.
I would agree also that, in a promotion case, establishing that the plaintiff is at least as we ll qualified
may not be sufficient to create a prima facie case.

Prior

decisions, particularly Burdine, have emphasized that an
inference of discrimination must be shown to make out a prima facie case.

Where only a single executive positio n is to

be filled, a showing of "at least as well qualified '' does
not necessarily create this inference.

You state good rea-

sons for this view.
In making judgme nts to fill executive positions,
subjective considerations customarily enter into the decisions.

There may be two exceptionally well qualified candi-

dates whose education and experience appear to qualify them
both equally well.

A choice between them must be made, and

this may be done with no intent whateve r to discriminate
against the other.

If there is a discriminatory intent,

there usually will be some evidence of it.

As your opinion

notes, there was abundant evidence here to create a strong
inference of discrimination, and therefore a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of going forward to the
defendant.
On pages 8 and 9 you refer unnessarily, as I view
it, several times to the "presumptio n", characterizing it as
"the Burdine presumption".

I doubt that I can go along with

changing the emphasis in these cases, and treating the result of a prima facie case here as different from that in
McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine .

;

4•
As we said in McDonnell-Douglas:

"The critical

issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof"
in a Title VII case.

The terms prima facie and presumption

have been used only for this purpose.
make a prima facie case.

The plaintiff must

This requires a sufficient showing

to create an inference of discrimination.

If this is done

there is a presumpti on which if unrebutted would justify
judgment for the plaintiff.

But its effect merely is to

shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with rebutting evidence.

The burden of ultimate persuasion, of

course, remains on the plaintiff.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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Rehnquist
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FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
81-1044 U.S. Postal Se~vice v. Aikens

You suggested that I indicate specifically why I
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am hesitant to join your opinion.

I am with you, of course,

through the first four pages.
My difficulty commences with the second full paragraph on page 5.

There, you emphasize primarily a part of

what was said in Burdine about a presumption being created
by a prima facie case.

I agree that a "presumption" and

"inference" do not necessarily have the same consequences.
,,

't •;

But Burdine defines the consequence~ in cases of this kind.
Thi ' two are used in coniunction:

once a prima facie case is

established, ,a " rebuttable oresumption arises.

only footnote 7.

You mention

Actually, the text of Burdine repeatedly

refers to the presumption.

See, e.g., pp. 254, 255.

Its
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role is described more fully in fn. 8 and 10. , In the former, we state,, the re lat ion ship between the presumption and

the prima facie case, and also expressly state that the term

p

"presumption" properly used "refers only to a device for
allocation of the production burden".
)'.
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Also, you used the

word "presume" i.n Furnco in substantially the ~ame sense:

a
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result from th_e cestablishment of a prima facie case.

~',, . I

am afraid substantial confusion will result from
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the way thjs paragraph ls now written.
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And, certainly, I
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woula not describe our precedents as creating a "seemingly
drastic rule" :-:'
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If you revise page 5 substantially along the above
lines, possibly some conforming changes would have to be
made in the first two sentences (beginning "More succinctly
phrased •• • ) of your text on page 6 .
I have no difficulty with the two full paragraphs
on page 6, but again become uneasy with what you seem to say
primarily on pages 7 and 8 .

As I read your opinion , you

reject the principles of the prior cases as being wholly
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inapplicable to a promotion case. · 'T'his ' seems unnecessary .
-

/

•

iJ

,.,

"I

'

):·. "'.D 'T'hls case conld be written in ' astraightforward '
~ •.'!•

'

•;

jp

I~.

manner. by starting, as you do (p. 3 , 4), with the statement
in McDonnell-Douglas that the facts necessc,.rily will vary in
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Title VII .. cases
and "the specifications [set' forth in
..
1cDonnell-Douglas : forJ the Prima ~aci~ proof ~equire~ from
.
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responaent are not necessarily applicable in ' every resoect "
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to ·differing
factual ;ituations" .
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Douglas and Biirdine .

In a caRe such as this, w~ere only a.•

single executive positon is to be filled , the elements of a
prima facie case l - ~- in addition to the applicable ones of
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McDonnell-Douglas - include a showing that ,. the plai.ntiff is
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I would agree also that, in a promotion case, es~
tablishinq that the plaintiff is at least as well qualified
may not be sufficient to create a prima facie case.

Prior

decisions, particularly Burdine, have emphasized that an
inference of discrimination must be shown to make out a prima facie case. · Where only a single executive position is to
be filled, a showing of "at least as well quallfied" does
·f"•.,·•
r
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not necessarily create,,,. this inference.
sons for this view. ·
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You state good rea\,
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In making judgments to fill ~executive positions,
subjective considerations customarily enter into the deci,;,.,,,.,
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dates whose education and experience appear to qualify them
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there usually will be some evidence of it • • As your opinion
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notes, there was abundant evidence here to create a strong
inference of discrimination, and therefore a cebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of going forward to the
defendant.
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On paqes 8 and 9 you refer unnessarily, as I view ·

it, 'several times to the "presumption", characterizing it as
"the Burdine presumption".

I doubt that I can go along with

changing the emphasis in these cases, and treating the result of a prima facie case here as different from that in
McDonnell-Douqlas and Burdine.
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As we said in Mcnonnell-Douglas:

"The critical

issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof"
in a ~itle VII case.

The terms prima facie and presumption

have been use8 only for this purpose.
make a prima facie case.

The plaintiff must

This requires a sufficient showing

to create an inference of discr5mination.

tf this is done

there is a presumptiol" which if unr.ebutted would justify
/.i

judgment for the plaintiff.

But its effect rnerelv is to

shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with rebutting evidence.

The buroen of ultimate persuasion, of

cours~, remaing on th@ plaintiff.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 28, 1982

Re:

No. 81-1044, U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

Dear Bill:
I

join.

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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December 30, 1982
J-'

81-1044 Postal Service v. ~ikens

Dear Bill:
\,:ti:.

I have reread your opinion, as well as McDonnellDouglas and Burdine. I am afraio we are farther apart than
I had supposed.
,, .. ,
'·

The enclosed memorandum, responding to your suggestion prior to Christmas, makes specific suggestions.
I will, of course, un1er.stand if you find these
unacceptable. In that event, I will join your judgment but
write separ :fl'at',,e ly.

Sincerely,

,1)

1,1',,,

i

,,

v . Aikens

..

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
/
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated:JAN 1 1 1983
Recirculated:

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BQARD OF G~{VERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS
AIKENS )

fl·

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED ~TES eot:fuT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[January - , 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792
(1973), a unanimous Court established the framework for
proving employment discrimination under Title VII. The
structure of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas and succeeding cases fairly takes into account both the difficulty of proving discriminatory motive and the importance of discouraging
nonmeritorious suits. The Court today holds that the "principles established" in "the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases"
were never "meant to apply to" claims of discrimination
against applicants for "higher managerial" positions. Ante,
at 2--3, 7. This conclusion surely comes as a surprise, for the
McDonnell Douglas principles have been applied in the managerial context not only by the lower courts, but also by this
Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). In my view, the distinction
now drawn between managerial and nonmanagerial cases is
untenable.' Moreover, even if it were proper to apply a difThe distinction is also unwieldy. The majority opinion indicates at
various points that its new analytical framework applies to "higher managerial" or "managerial" positions, ante at 1, 7, but the majority does not
even attempt to define these terms. Future courts will initially have to
determine whether the McDonnell Douglas structure of proof applies to
the position to which a plaintiff applied, and this will inevitably prompt ad1

-----,,L-/____
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ferent structure of proof to managerial cases, I believe that
respondent introduced sufficient evidence to establish a presumption of discrimination as a matter of law. For these
reasons, I dissent.
I
Until today, this Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), governed "the basic
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a
Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment." Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981). 2 McDonnell Douglas and its progeny established a
three-step inquiry for analyzing the proof in a Title VII case:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection.' [411 U. S.], at 802.
Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but
were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804." Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. S., at 252-253.
Critical to the McDonnell Douglas framework is the employer's duty to "explain[] clearly the nondiscriminatory readitional litigation. In the labor law area, the definition of the analogous
concept of supervisory status "has spawned an immense amount of litigation, generating controversy in hundreds of cases before courts and thousands of cases before the National Labor Relations Board." Note, The
NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of Inconsistent Results, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1713, 1713 (1981).
2
See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335--336, n. 15 (1977).
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sons for its actions." Id., at 260. 3 To be sure, the employer's duty is a minimal one: it need only explain what it has
done or produce evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons. The burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff. Id., at 256-257.
Nevertheless, the employer's explanation is essential to
"bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to"
the question of intentional discrimination. Id., at 253. In
particular, the employer's presentation of a reason for its action "frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that
the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id., at 255-256.
When an employer fails to carry its burden of articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision or
8
The employer's burden here is simply one of production, rather than
persuasion. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U. S. 248, 256 (1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1978). This burden of production serves
two important functions. It eliminates most of the virtually limitless number of considerations upon which the employer might have relied in making
its employment decision. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. analysis thereby
focuses the issue to be tried in the case. The second important function of
the employer's burden of production is that it elicits material information
from the .Party that is in control of the information. A Title VII plaintiff
can be expected to show that he applied for the job or promotion, he was
qualified according to the employer's enunciated qualifications, and he was
rejected in favor of a nonminority candidate. But he cannot know the contents of the employer's personnel files or on what subjective ground the
employer decided to hire someone else over him. Similarly, the workings
of a subjective evaluation process are beyond the knowledge of a rejected
plaintiff.
Even the most liberal civil discovery is not an adequate substitute for the
employer's burden of production. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. standard requires an employer to state in court what legitimate reason it had for
rejecting the plaintiff. "An articulation not admitted into evidence will
not suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through
an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel." Burdine, 450
U. S., at 255, n. 9.

;
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proffers an explanation that is "unworthy of credence," id.,
at 256, a Title VII plaintiff obtains the benefit of the rebuttable presumption of discrimination that arises once a prima facie case is established under McDonnell Douglas. In this
situation, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
The threshold showing required to establish the rebuttable
presumption has never entailed more than simply adducing
evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.
The Court made this clear in Teamsters v. United States, 431
U. S. 324, 358 (1977), when it cited McDonnell Douglas for
the "general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry
the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act." (emphasis
added). We reaffirmed this principle in Burdine, where we
stated, "The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she applied for an available position for which
she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."
450 U. S., at 253 (emphasis added). See also Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 576 (1978).
The Negro plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, like Aikens,
submitted proof that he was rejected for an available position
for which he was qualified. This evidence created an inference of discrimination because in the absence of a legitimate
business reason for the employer's decision, it is more likely
than not that the applicant's race was a factor in the employer's decision. "As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case 'raises an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. 4
• Thus, in order to warrant a presumption of discrimination, McDonnell
Douglas does not require a plaintiff to eliminate all conceivable, or even all
common, nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. If the applicant

;
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I do not see why these considerations are any less applicable when this showing is made by an applicant for a managerial position than by applicants for nonmanagerial positions. The Court correctly observes that in making its
promotion decisions the Postal Service may have considered
any among "a wide range of factors." Ante, at 7. Undoubtedly, many legitimate factors are subjective. Yet employers
commonly rely on subjective considerations in making employment decisions outside the "higher managerial" context.
In many cases such subjective considerations have been
In others, they have been deemed
found legitimate. 5
pretextual. 6 The majority's observation that managers and
mechanics require different qualifications does not justify its
conclusion that in this case the employer's acts, if otherwise
unexplained, were somehow less likely to have been based on
impermissible factors. Since Aikens' proof need only give
rise to a presumption of discrimination in the absence of any
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision, it is irrelevant how many legitimate considerations could conceivably have justified the Postal Service's
acts and whether those considerations might have been objective or subjective. What is relevant is the unlikelihood
that the Postal Service would have denied Aikens' application
for no reason. "We know from experience that people do not
were required to meet this burden at the outset, the employer's subsequent explanation of his employment decision would be superflous.
Rather, the plaintiff is required to do only what Aikens has easily done,
which is to eliminate the two "most common reasons," Burdine, supra, at
254 (emphasis supplied), which may legitimately support a denial of employment-the unavailability of a position and the applicant's failure to satisfy stated qualifications.
5
See, e.g., Shack v. Southworth, 521 F. 2d 51, 55 (CA6 1975); Causey
v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416, 424 (CA5 1975); Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation, 11 FEP 1426, 1436 (D Mass. 1976); Van de Vate v. Boling, 379
F.Supp. 925, 928 (ED Tenn. 1974).
6
See, e.g., Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416, 422--423 (CA5
1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F. 2d 1009, 1012 (CAlO 1975); Rogers v.
EEOC, 11 FEP 416, 419 (CA9 1974).

;
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act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting." Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577.
When an employer is unable to articulate any legitimate
reason for hiring a white applicant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that decision was based at
least in part on impermissible considerations. There is no
reason to believe that discrimination is any less prevalent in
hiring for supervisory positions than it is in hiring for lower
level positions. 7 While subjective considerations are rele7
When Congress enacted the Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
which made Title VII fully applicable to federal agencies, it made clear its
particular concern with the exclusion of minorities from high level positions. Both the Senate and House Reports .cited the exclusion of Negroes
from professional and managerial positions as evidence that they were
"still far from reaching their rightful place in society." S. Rep. No. 92-415
(92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1971), p. 6; H. Rep. No. 92-238 (92d Cong., 1st Sess.
1971), p. 4. Congress recognized that the problems of racial discrimination addressed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act had proved to be more complex,
deep rooted, and intractable than it believed in 1964:
"In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the
part of some identifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a
scheme that stressed conciliation rather than compulsory processes would
be most appropriate for the resolution of this essentially 'human' problem,
and that litigation would be necessary on an occasional basis. Experience
has proved this view to be false.
"Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and
pervasive phemomenon." S. Rep. No. 92-415, su'{Yra, at 5.
With regard to the Government particularly, Congress found that the
concentration of minorities and women in nonsupervisory positions was
symptomatic of employment discrimination:
"Statistical evidence shows that minorities and women continue to be excluded from large numbers of government jobs, particularly at the higher
grade levels ....
"This disproportionate distribution of minorities and women throughout
the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from higher level policy-mak-
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vant in hiring a supervisor, evaluations of such subjective criteria as the applicant's "ability to work effectively with particular superiors and subordinates," ante, at 7, are certainly
more susceptible to illegitimate considerations than are evaluations of objective criteria.
"[P]rocedures which depend almost entirely upon the
subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of
the immediate [supervisors] are a ready mechanism for
discrimination against Blacks. . . . We and others have
expressed a skepticism that Black persons dependent directly on decisive recommendations from Whites can expect nondiscriminatory action." Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F. 2d 348, 359 (CA5 1972) (citations
omitted).
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 497 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 433 (1975). If
anything, it is particularly true with respect to the higher
levels of employment that "when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons
for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not that the
ing and supervisory positions indicates the government's failure to pursue
its policy of equal opportunity." H. Rep. No. 92-238, supra, at 23.
In the years that followed, Congress recognized the need for additional
remedies for discrimination which remains pervasive on the highest as well
as the lowest rungs of the employment ladder both inside and outside the
Government. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. §§ 2302(d), 7201, 4313(5) (1978);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) (discussing the set-aside provisions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977). Only a few months
ago, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that gross inequalities in the labor force, which have been reduced only marginally over the
past decade, must be explained by the "effect [of discrimination] on blacks,
Hispanics and women in their struggle to find jobs commensurate with
their qualifications and experience." U. S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Unemployment and Underemployment Among Blacks, Hispanics, and
Women (Nov. 1982), at 57.

.,
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employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race." Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
supra, at 577 (emphasis in original).
The irrelevance of the distinction now drawn between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions is clearly recognized
in our past decisions. It is possible in any Title VII case that
the employer had a legitimate subjective reason for its refusal to hire or promote the applicant. In McDonnell Douglas the employer asserted that in refusing to hire the plaintiff
it had relied on subjective hiring judgments. 411 U. S., at
803; 463 F. 2d 337, 352 (CA8 1972). While we held that employers may rely on subjective criteria in rebutting charges
of discrimination, 411 U. S., at 803-804, we certainly did not
require the plaintiff to anticipate and rebut such justifications
as part of his prima facie case. Rather, once the plaintiff set
forth evidence that gave rise to an inference of discrimination
in the absence of a nondiscriminatory justification for the employer's decision, the employer was required to articulate a
legitimate business justification for its action.
Burdine reaffirmed the appropriateness of the McDonnell
Douglas standard for all Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment. The plaintiff in Burdine sought a promotion
to the supervisory position of Project Director in the Public
Service Careers Division of the Texas Department of Community Affairs. She was denied the promotion and was subsequently discharged before being rehired to a position comparable that to which she had originally aspired. Certainly
these decisions could have rested on the very factors that the
majority deems relevant to this case, the applicant's "understanding of the organization's goals, ability to work effectively with particular superiors and subordinates, maturity,
originality, initiative, and decision making ability." Ante, at
7. Yet the unanimous Court in Burdine made clear that the
McDonnell Douglas "allocation of burdens and order of pres-

;
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entation of proof'' was fully applicable to that case. 450
U. S., at 252-256. I am at loss to see any distinction between this case and Burdine.

II
Even assuming that the prima facie case described in McDonnell Douglas does not, standing alone, justify an inference of discrimination in a suit involving a supervisory position, Aikens certainly introduced sufficient additional
evidence to warrant such an inference. 8 Since the majority
gives only passing attention to the evidence, it is necessary to
set out the stipulated or otherwise uncontroverted facts in
some detail.
A

Aikens, a Negro male, was an employee of the United
States Postal Service and its predecessor from 1937 until his
retirement. He was promoted to his first supervisory position on October 1, 1952, and held various foreman positions
until 1960, the highest being ranked PFS-7 under the Postal
Service's old grading system. From 1960 through 1966,
8
I therefore believe that the majority errs in concluding that the presumption was unwarranted in this case. I am somewhat at a loss as to
why the majority decides this issue. In this case the Postal Service did
advance reasons below for denying promotions to Aikens. Petitioner contended that by turning down two lateral transfers that were offered to him,
Aikens failed to acquire necessary experience and familiarity with the
Postal Service. Since the District Court found that this explanation was
not pretextual-a finding which was in my view clearly erroneous-its
resolution of the question whether Aikens' initial showing gave rise to a
rebuttable presumption was not necessary to the decision below. Rather
than "tak[ing] the case as it comes to us," ante, at 2, the Court should
never have taken this case at all. I believe that today's decision is an advisory opinion on an issue that is not properly before us. Nevertheless, I
take the majority opinion as it comes to me and address my dissenting remarks to the merits.

;
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Aikens received six promotions or lateral transfers, until he
attained the position of Assistant Director for Transit Mails
(PFS-15). He was the first Negro to reach that level.
From August 1966 to March 1973, there were only four positions higher than Aikens' in the Washington, D.C., post office: Director for Installation Services (PFS-17), Assistant
Director for Operations Division for Distribution (PFS-16),
Director for Operations Division (PFS-17), and Postmaster
(PFS-18). During that period, seven white males-L.M.
Lieb, L.V. Bateman, Jr., E.C. Ray, D.M. Barranca, M.G.
Thomas, F.A. Miller, and Ellsworth Rapee-were promoted
or detailed 9 into one or more of these positions over Aikens a
total of 29 times. The availability of promotions and details
to high level jobs in the Service was not posted, and candidates were not notified as a matter of course that they were
under consideration. D.C. Postmaster Carlton Beall apparently made all detail assignments until he was promoted to
District Postal Manager in July 1971. After Beall's promotion, a promotion advisory board made one set of recommendations that resulted in Lieb's promotion to Assistant Director for Operations Division for Distribution and Rapee's
• A promotion entails a permanent assignment to a position. A detail is
a temporary assignment to a supervisory position. Under Postal Service
procedure at the time, an employee had to file a Form 1717 in order to indicate that he or she wanted to be considered for a job. Aikens filed these
forms for all of the jobs above his position. For a detail, a higher level
supervisor with authority over the position assigned an employee by signing a Form 1723 Assignment Order. A detail normally lasted 89 days, but
frequently was extended by the signing of another Assignment Order for a
second 89-day period. Although details were to be renewed only once, the
Postal Service often had employees who stayed on detail for years. The
D.C. Postmaster and the District Postal Manager were the supervisors responsible for the positions in which Aikens indicated interest. Carlton
Beall was the D.C. Postmaster until July 1971, when he was promoted to
District Postal Manager. Ellsworth Rapee became D.C. Postmaster upon
Beall's promotion. Detail assignments were made by Beall or by Rapee
with the concurrence of Beall.

;

81-1044-DISSENT
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS

11

promotion to Director for Operations Division. In both
cases, Aikens was the board's second choice.
In March of 1973, the Postal Service conducted a reevaluation of its grading system, called the Job Evaluation Program
(JEP). Under the new grading, Aikens' position of Assistant Director for Transit Mails was rated as PES-20. Three
other positions in the D.C. area that had been graded PFS-15
were upgraded to PES-23. Because of the regrading, several additional positions were rated above Aikens' position
and several more junior white males received details or promotions above Aikens. 10
After the regrading, Aikens was again passed over in favor
of several junior white males. M.G. Thomas was detailed
twice and F.A. Miller three times to the position of Assistant
Director for Operations Division for Distribution. In addition, on September 29, 1973, A.J. Eckerl replaced D.J. Robertson as Manager of Personnel, a position that had been upgraded to PES-23. At the same time, Robertson was
promoted to Employee and Labor Relations Specialist, a
newly regraded PES-24 position for which Aikens was qualified. Other whites who were promoted over him included
W.E. Hahn, J.J. Spelta, and C. Errico. In late 1973,
Aikens also was passed over for the positions at issue in this
lawsuit: Mail Processing Officer, Acting Mail Processing
Representative, Director for Operations Division, and Customer Services Representative. 11 These positions were
filled by Barranca, Miller, Rapee, and Thomas.
Aikens was undeniably qualified for the jobs to which
10
Aikens unsuccessfully appealed his regrading. In the appeal, he
sought a PES--23 rating for his position in order to remain eligible for the
D.C. Postmaster position. He objected to the anomaly of being graded
lower than those over whom he had supervisory authority.
11
Although Aikens was passed over continually during this period, he
failed to file timely administrative complaints with regard to other instances of discrimination. 5 CFR § 713.214 (complaints must be filed
within 30-days of discriminatory action).

;
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white males were appointed instead of him. The Postal
Service stipulated below that "there was no derogatory or
negative information found in plaintiff's Official Personnel
Folder to indicate that he had not fulfilled the requirements
of his position." Joint Appendix, at 7 (stipulation of facts).
"In 1968 Plaintiff was rated as 'an outstanding supervisor
whose management abilities were far above average.'" Id.,
at 8.
Indeed, Aikens' credentials appear to have been superior.
Aikens' educational experience exceeded that of the white supervisors promoted over him. "Plaintiff has a Master's degree and completed 3 years residence on his Ph.D." Id., at
7. Beall, the Postmaster and later District Postal Manager,
had completed the tenth grade. Robertson had one and a
half years of college. Barranca had eight months of college.
Eckerl, Lieb, Thomas, Errico, and Hahn were high school
graduates. Rapee, who was detailed as Postmaster, and
Ray had completed the eleventh grade. Miller had completed his sophomore year in high school. 12 The educational
background of Bateman and Spelta is not in the record.
Ibid. In addition, Aikens had more experience in supervisory positions than any of the whites other than Spelta. He
had more seniority in the Postal Service than even Spelta.
Aikens had as many or more training courses and seminars as
the whites. The promotions and detail records show that
Aikens had as much or more experience in varied and specific
supervisory positions than his white colleagues.
Aikens also introduced anecdotal evidence to show that
Beall, who was primarily responsible for promotion decisions,
12

Miller's lack of education was apparently a serious practical handicap.
A coworker testified at trial that he had to "write all [of Miller's] letters for
him because he couldn't write a decent report." Transcript, at 228. Despite this problem, however, Miller served as Mail Processing
Respresentative, Tour Superintendent, and Assistant Director for Operations Division for Distribution.
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was biased against Negroes. A Negro supervisor testified
that the Postmaster had stated to him that "[a]ll they [Negroes] want to do is to lay around and breed like yard dogs
and collect relief checks." Transcript, at 220. A white supervisor testified that Beall once told an all-white meeting:
"You know, they don't have to set in the back of the bus anymore." Id., at 250-251. Another Negro supervisor testified that Beall referred to Negroes nearly all the time as
"that crowd," and often made sarcastic remarks about
Aikens' educational achievements. Id., at 252-254.
Finally, Aikens introduced statistical evidence of the underrepresentation of minorities at higher levels. As of February 7, 1974, one month after Aikens filed his Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, whites held a disproportionate number of high level supervisory positions in the
Washington, D.C., post office. Although only 14.3% of the
total workforce of 8,634 were white, 34.1% of PES-1 through
PES-14 employees were white, and 48.4% of all categories
PES-15 and higher were white. Aikens remained the only
Negro at his level or higher until January 1974.

B
The Court acknowledges that McDonnell Douglas did not
limit the means by which a prima facie case may be established. Ante, at 3-4. See Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, supra, at 577; Teamsters v. United States, supra, at
362. Indeed, the Government has argued at length to this
Court in this very case that an applicant denied a supervisory
position may make any number of alternative showings that
suffice not only to compel his employer to articulate reasons
for its actions, but also to compel entry of judgment in his favor "[i]fthe trier of fact believes [his] evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of'' that evidence. Burdine,
supra, at 254. See Brief for the Petitioner, at 21-30. I
would hold that, as a matter of law, Aikens made such a
showing in this case.

;
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III
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green a unanimous Court
established a fair procedure for proving all claims of discriminatory treatment. The fairness and appropriateness of this
procedure had not been questioned by this Court in any of its
subsequent opinions. Today, the Court nevertheless exempts a broad class of cases from the McDonnell Douglas
framework on the basis of an entirely untenable distinction
between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. Those
discriminated against in supervisory, professional and other
positions to which subjective qualifications are often relevant, will no longer have the fair opportunity to recover that
this Court previously assured. By making it more difficult
for victims of discrimination at the higher levels of employment to seek redress, the Court undermines the unequivocal
congressional purpose of eliminating discrimination from all
the workplaces of this nation. I dissent.
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Please join me in your dissent in the above.
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Justice Marshall
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I think Justice Marshall's dissent is well done, but it
does not agree with your views as I understand them.

As I read it,

it adopts a low-level test for establishing a prima facie case.

A

Title VII plaintiff must show that "he was qualified according to
the employer's enunciated qualifications."

Seep. 3 n. 3.

Although

the employer has the option of defining its job criteria narrowly, a
minority applicant who met those criteria and was rejected for a job
would have established a prima facie case.
Justice Marshall seems to add a new twist to the McDonnell
Douglas test.

The inference of discrimination does not arise from
.,

the plaintiff's level of proof but from the employer's failure t ·o
articulate a legitimate reason for refusing to hire him:
"When the employer is unable to articulate any
legitimate reason for hiring a white applicant over a
qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that
[his] decision was based at least in part on impermissible
considerations." See page 6.
Thus, Justice Marshall focuses on the idea that even if the acts
proved by the plaintiff alone would not establish discrimination,
these same acts, if otherwise unexplained, do establish
discrimination.

This, however, would place too little emphasis on

2.

the prima facie case since under Justice Marshall's view, any facts
would suffice so long as they are not explained.
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SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[January - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service, discriminated against him on account of his race.
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in
the Washington, D.C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 642 F. 2d 514
(CA DC 1980). We vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in the light of
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof
of discriminatory intent. 665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CA DC 1981)
(Per Curiam). We granted certiorari to consider the assessment of proof of racial discrimination when an employer has
selected among applicants for a higher managerial position 1•
- u. s. - (1982).
We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Commu1

;
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The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent 2, but also that it erred in
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who
were promoted. The Postal Service insists that an employee
who has shown only that he was black, that he had applied for
a promotion for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that the Postal Service selected a non-minority applicant has not established a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination under Title VII.
Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the District Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case. Indeed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court in
January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been
disposed of in a relatively short span of time (according to judicial lights) with the District Court making the necessary essential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under
the appropriate standards 3 • But we take the case as it
comes to us.
We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Dougnity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, n. 14 (1973).
2
As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, n. 44
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination.")
3
See Pullman Standard v. Swint, U.S.-, (1982).
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las v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1972), reveal a misunderstanding
of that line of cases. Because this misunderstanding may
have been shared in part by the District Court and by the
Court of Appeals in the present case, we take the liberty of
setting forth the facts as well as the law in the principal cases
in the McDonnell-Douglas line.
In McDonnell-Douglas itself, the defe~dant employer ran
a newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics.
The plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by
the defendant, applied for reemployment. The defendant
declined to rehire him, even though it continued to hire other
applicants who responded to the advertisement after the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the
District Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. That court held that the reason given by the
defendant for refusing to rehire plaintiff-plaintiff's participation in a "stall in" and "lock-in" at defendant's place of business-was a "subjective" criterion that carried little weight
in rebutting charges of discrimination. The Court of Appeals set forth its version of a prima f acie case of discrimination under Title VII.
Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima
facie case:
"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id., at 802.

We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of

81-1044-0PINION
4

U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS

the prima f acie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13.
We returned to the same question in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978). The employer's business was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with
"fire brick." The employer did not maintain a permanent
force of bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for
each project, and then delegated to him the task of securing a
competent work force. The superintendent who declined to
hire the plaintiff did not accept applications at the job site,
but hired only persons he knew to be experienced and competent in this work or who had been recommended to him as
similarly skilled. The employer claimed this policy was established to ensure that only experienced and highly qualified
fire bricklayers were employed, because untimely work could
result in substantial losses both to the steel mill operator and
to the contractor-employer. Id., at 569-572.
We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. We disagreed, however, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's
hiring practices were illegitimate.
In discussing the
showings required of the parties to Title VII suits, we
pointed out:
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is
always whether the employer is treating 'some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.' Int'l. Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, supra,[431 U. S.,] at 335, n.
15. The method suggested in McDonnell-Douglas for
pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely
a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light
of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." 438 U. S., at 577.
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Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed
that the employer's failure to promote her and its later decision to terminate her had both resulted from gender-based
discrimination. The District Court found after a bench trial
that neither decision was discriminatory. Id., at 251. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of
the District Court as to the promotion, but reversed its finding on the termination.
We reviewed only the part of the case that had been reversed by the Court of Appeals, 4 and stated more clearly the
consequences of the plaintiff's success in making the showing
required by McDonnell Douglas. The primafacie case in a
Title VII action is not merely the minimum showing that will
justify a verdict for the plaintiff, it "creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Id., at 254, n. 7. If the employer does not rebut
this presumption by "clearly set[ting] forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action, id., at 255, the district court
"must enter judgment for the plaintiff." Id., at 254 (emphasis supplied).
The justification for this seemingly drastic rule can be
found in Furnco:
"A prima facie case under McDonnell-Douglas raises
an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. . . . And we are willing to presume this largely because we know that from our experience that more often
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner,
without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
'Thus Burdine's failure to be promoted to a managerial position was not
before us.
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setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting
an applicant had been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, whom we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." 438 U. S., at 577.
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the
most common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs
rejection." Burdine, supra, at 254. For this reason, we
have held that an unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently
compelling to require a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter
of law.
In the present case, both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases. We disagree. The first and third elements
of McDonnell-Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens belongs to a racial minority, and he applied for the promotions
in question but was denied them. The fourth element, however, is entirely absent; the position did not remain open, as
it did in McDonnell-Douglas, but was filled by the applicant
chosen in preference to Aikens. Indeed, where an employer
seeks to fill a single managerial position, the position will by
definition not be open after one of the applicants has been
chosen.
The second McDonnell-Douglas element-the showing
that the plaintiff was "qualified" for the job-is more problematic. There is no doubt that Aikens had an impressive
resume. He has a Masters Degree and has completed three
years of residence towards a Ph.D. He has been rated as
"an outstanding supervisor whose management abilities are
far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more
supervisory seniority and training and development courses
than all but one of the white persons who were promoted
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above him. It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient,
in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious
consideration.
At this point, however, agreement between the parties,
and between the courts that have considered this factual
issue, breaks down. It is argued that Aikens must show he
is "as qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better qualified" than the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified,"
or merely "qualified" for the jobs he sought. We believe
that this contest of comparatives ultimately proves selfstultifying.
The fair reading of the McDonnell-Douglas advertisement
for qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably
objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic,
and that applicants would be hired on a first come, first
served basis until the employer had obtained the number of
mechanics it needed. But where one managerial position is
open, there may be no totally objective measure of who is
"qualified," and the employer certainly does not undertake to
promote more than one applicant. Employers consider a
wide range of factors, such as each applicant's understanding
of the organization's goals, ability to work effectively with
particular superiors and subordinates, maturity, originality,
initiative, and decision making ability. It will rarely, if ever,
be possible to quantify all the relevant criteria and tally them
up on a score card.
In these circumstances, the question is not whether we will
"follow" the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases, but whether
the principles established in those cases were ever meant to
apply to a situation so far removed from their factual context. 5 If those principles do not provide the district courts
5Tbe dissent asserts that a primafacie case arose in McDonnell-Douglas when the black plaintiff "submitted proof that he was rejected for an
available position for which he was qualified." Post , at 4. The dissent
thus ignores the third element of the McDonnell-Douglas formulation and

I
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with a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light
of common experience," Furnco, supra, at 577, they are inapplicable under the terms of those decisions. Burdine,
supra, at 253, n. 6; Furnco, supra, at 575-576; International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324,
358 (1977); McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13.
McDonnell-Douglas and Furnco both dealt with entry
level jobs, one in a large manufacturing industry and the
other in the construction industry. In those cases, if the
plaintiff could meet the four elements of the McDonnellDoug las prima facie case-that he belonged to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants, that he was rejected,
and that after his rejection the employer continued to seek
similarly qualified applicants-the plaintiff has in effect negatived the principal broadly applicable reasons that would
show that the employer's refusal to hire him was not based on
a discriminatory animus.
But that simply is not true in the present case. There
were several applicants for each position, and only one could
be chosen. The "qualifications" for the position as laid down
by the Postal Service, while not appearing as clearly from the
record as might be, were by no means as easy to assess as the
qualifications for a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnellDouglas. We simply do not think that Aikens' showing that
he is black, that he was sufficiently qualified to be seriously
considered, and that he was not chosen, "eliminates the most
common non-discriminatory reasons" for his rejection.
Burdine, supra, at 254 (emphasis supplied).
We do not believe we can revise McDonnell Douglas to fit
these facts. To do so, we would be obliged to hold that
Aikens, merely by showing that he is black, he was qualified
for a single vacancy, and the Postal Service promoted antrivializes the differences in the kinds of qualifications necessary for the positions in that case and this.

J
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other of several non-minority applicants, was presumptively
the victim of discrimination. This we are unwilling to do;
such a showing in these circumstances does not justify the
presumption that the employer's acts "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors." Furnco, supra, at 577.
Although the 'ken showin made below does not justify
a presumption o 1scrimination, it is sufficient to support an
inference of discrimination. That is, if the District Court
were to conclude that the Postal Service did treat Aikens less
favorably than others because of his race, we surely could not
say, on the basis of the record before us, that such a finding
would be clearly erroneous. Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and detailed over him and
all other black persons between 1966 and 1974. Aikens had
substantially more education than the white employees who
were advanced ahead of him; of the 12, only 2 had any education beyond high school and none had a college degree.
Aikens introduced testimony at trial that the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous
derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in
particular.
We believe that the District Court, which is able to perceive the attitude and demeanor of witnesses, and to evaluate
their credibility and the weight that should be placed on their
testimony, is in a far better position than this Court to decide
whether the Postal Service discriminated againt Aikens.
The District Court should decide this case in the same manner that it decides questions of fact in the myriad other kinds
of litigation before it.
We therefore hold that in a case such as this, where no
standardized prima facie case can be made out, the district
court should evaluate all the admissible evidence and then decide the factual question of discrimination. Thus, plaintiffs
may seek to obtain the benefit of the Burdine presumption by

+t-
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making out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, and may
also seek to prove their case in the ordinary way 6• A plaintiff, through use of the liberal discovery provided in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 2(h37, can depose a defendant's employees and obtain
relevant documents relating to employment decisions. Of
course, a plaintiff who fails to make out a McDonnell Douglas
primafacie case will not survive a motion for judgment at the
close of his case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) unless he has
presented evidence from which the district court can infer
that he was discriminated against. See Teamsters, supra, at
358. This case presents one example of that sort of
evidence.
JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent contends that this opinion
"exempts a broad class of cases from the McDonnell-Douglas
framework on the basis of an entirely untenable distinction
between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions." Post,
p. 14. We do no such thing. We hold the McDonnell-Douglas presumption inapplicable because by its terms it requires
that plaintiff prove four elements in order to have the benefit
of it, and in this case respondent Aikens proved only two of
those four elements. The dissent also states that even if the
McDonnell-Douglas presumption does not apply, Aikens
"certainly introduced sufficient additional evidence to warrant such an inference." Post, at 9. We fully agree that the
evidence introduced by Aikens more than adequately supports an inference of discrimination, on the basis of which the
finder of fact would be entirely justified in concluding that
Aikens had been the victim of discrimination; we summarize
that evidence earlier in the opinion. The dissent insists on
A rough analogy may be found in the law relating to res ipsa loquitur
In some circumstances a showing of circumstances
sufficient to raise res ipsa creates a rebuttable presumption like the
Burdine presumption. See Prosser, Torts 229-230 (1971). A tort plaintiff can also seek to show negligence directly without abandoning the benefit of res ipsa. Id., at 231-232.
6

in negligence actions.
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equating the "inference" of discrimination with the rebuttable "presumption" brought into play by McDonnell-Douglas,
post, at 9. The distinction between the two was pointed out
in footnote 7 of our opinion in Burdine. For the reasons
stated above, we do not think a presumption is warranted in
this case.
All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult.
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. In
any Title VII case, regardless whether the prima facie case
device is available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is
"whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters,
supra, at 335, n. 15). There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes, but this does
not mean that courts should treat the question of discrimination differently from other questions of fact. The law often
obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind.
As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div.
459, 483 (1885).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the
case is remanded with directions to remand to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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I concur in the judgment of the Court.
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agree, however, that resolution of the question presented
here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

~~

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) /" ~
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Respondent, who is black, applied for several
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office.
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white
applicants.

Respondent brought this action under Title

2.

VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.,

alleging that the Postal Service had discriminated against
him on account of his race.

After a full trial, the

District Court for the District of Columbia found that the
respondent had failed to prove a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas since he had not shown that he was "as
qualified or more qualified" than the other candidates.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.
reversed~
~

-

~

'
~
~~
e

The Court of Appeals

'94.sti;ict Gourt haa s.e-t ~o

silJa' a ~

Under its view of McDonnell Douglas, a
~

;

plaintiff automatically establishes a prima facie case

whenever he proves that he belongs to a racial minority,
that he applied for an available position for which he
possessed the "qualifications or background experiences
the employer has indicated are important," and that a

3.

nonminority applicant was selected , insteaa. 1
105 7, 1060 (CA DC 1981)

The Court~
view.

See ante, at 8.

See 665 F.2d

(per cur iam) .

ctly I believe--rejects this
To establish a prima facie case a

Title VII plaintiff must introduce evidence that
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for
his rejection.

See Texas Department of Community Affairs

1 The Court of Appeals held initially that a Title VII
plaintiff must show only that he possessed the minimum
qualifications to perform a job. See 642 F.2d 514, 519 (CA DC
1980). We vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). 453 U.S. 902 (1981). On remand the court
adhered to its earlier holding.
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4.

the employment decision being made before it determines
whether a plaintiff has satisfied his initial burden.
As the Court recognizes, when an employer

'.Le,

4~
selects one of severJi appiicants for ~
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gerial

position, he customarily takes into account a wide range
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of subjectivee consideration~
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as decision making

~..

ability, leadership, and ability to work well with other
employees.

See ante, at 7.

A-editional~ ~ ven those

applicants who meet the employer's minimum objective
qualififications geAer~~ ~ possess varying levels of
,1
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selecting a person to fill an executive

a.,..~

position, a-rr employer typically will choose the applicant
t'\

~tl<J~~~
who is mo~t qualified--i.e., the applicant who presents

---i

the optimal combination of subjective qualifications the
~~

a.--L-

employer values and outstanding objective qualifications.
"'\
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With respect to this type of employment decision, a
disappointed minority applicant who can establish only
that he met the employer's minimum objective
qualifications simply will not have eliminated the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection.

See

Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44.
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Additionally, when only one position i s ~ and
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t h e emp 1 oyer c h ooses f rom a poo 1 o Aqual1 1ed app 1cants,
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he necessarily preferf one applicant over another.

A

I\
choice has to be made and the employer's isolated decision
to select a qualified nonminority applicant rather than a
)

~
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qualified minority applicant does not imply that the
I'\

choice was discriminatory.

Cf. Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44 (197 ~

n this respect,

the decision here differs significantly from the decision
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in McDonnell Douglas.

In that case ,,\ he employer rejected

a qualified minority applicant :...,
~

;;f ~

position

unfilled and continued to seek qualified applicants.
411 U.S., at 802.

~

Because the employer's decision in

See

-

cDoRRQll Dougla-s was facially inconsistent with its own
economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was
rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination."

253.

\

Burdine, supra, at

2Thus to the extent the Court holds that the

Court of Appeals set too low a standard for this type ·of
employment decision, I agree with its reasoning.

The

Court, however, does not ge- o~ ~o specify the proof that
would be sufficient to create a prima facie case in this
context.

~

It determines instead that t:-he prima facie case,
~

7.

and the entire McDonnell Douglas framework,
inapplicable to managerial decisions.
~./u,,,Le_
The reasons for this 00fiCltlsion are difficult to

"
fathom.

The Court draws a distinction between evidence

that establishes a "McDonnell Douglas presumption" and
evidence that establishes an "inference of
discrimination."

Under its view, a McDonnell Douglas

presumption arises only when proof of the "standardized
prima facie case" eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's decision.

If

it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to a McDonneil
Douglas presumption.

Ibid.

In these situations, the

Court would require a plaintiff instead to introduce facts
that create an "inference" of discrimination and "prove
[his] case in the ordinary way."

Ibid.

In my view, the

8•

I

distinction the Court draws between a ~ d prima
facie case and facts that create an inference of
discrimination is neither required nor justified by our
past cases.

II

In Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously
the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof
initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
by the preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection.'
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third,
should the defendant carry this burden, the
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were

9.

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination." 450 U.S., at 252-253.

This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be
proved--whether the challenged employment decision was in
fact discriminatory.

The prima facie case, the initial

step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to
raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. 2

See

id., at 253-254.

---------.--

-
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2 JUSTICE MARSHALL'S issenting opinion reasons that it is the
employer's inability o articulate any legitimate reason for
prefering a nonminori y applicant that makes it "reasonable to
infer that [the] deci ion was based ... on impermissible
considerations." Pot, at 8. This places the burden on the
wrong party. Under urdine, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving facts that establish an inference of discrimination.
Only after the inference is established does the burden shift to
the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. See/ 450 U.S., at 254 (1981).
~ )
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In many cases, a plaintiff may satisfy his
initial burden by proving the four factors noted in
McDonnell Douglas.

See 411 U.S., at 802.

But we have

never held that proof of these factors automatically
establishes a prima facie case.

The facts in each case

will vary and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell
Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations."
n. 13.

See id., at 802

As we stated in Teamsters v. United States,

"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas
articulation of the prima facie case] lies, not
in its specification of the discrete elements of
proof there required, but in its recognition of
the general principle that any Title VII
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based
on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the
Act." 431 U.S., at 358.

~

"

Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the
particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's

11.

proof raises an inference of discrimination.

When a

plaintiff has met this initial burden, he "in effect
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against [him]."

Id., at 254.

As we

explained in Burdine, this presumption is primarily an
evidentiary device for allocating intermediary burdens of
proof.

It shifts the burden of production to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
his decision.

~

See id., at 255, n. 8.

>

Contrary to the Court's view, our cases make
l!);fiil>

clear that prima facie case was never intended to be a
rigid, standardized test.

See Furnco Construction Corp.

v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).

They establish that

the requirements of the prima facie case will vary in
accordance with the facts of each case.

Nor does the

7
I,

12.

Court's distinction between evidence that gives rise to an
inference of discrimination and that which gives rise to a
prima facie case find support in our precedent.
concepts instead are interrelated.

The two

Evidence that gives

rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case and shift the burden of
production to the employer.

See Burdine, supra, at 254:

Furnco, supra, at 577: Teamsters, supra, at 358.

III

In my view, the proper method of analysis--and
the one most consistent with our past opinions--is to
adapt the prima facie cas ~

ticular employment

~

decision being made.

As discussed above there are two

13.
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typical McDonnell Douglas factors.
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~ ere only a single executive position is to be

"'
filled, the elements of a prima facie case--in addition to
the applicable ones of McDonnell Douglas--include a
showing that the plaintiff is at least as well qualified
as the person who was given the promotion.

Absent such a

showing, a Title VII plaintiff will not have eliminated
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his
rejection.
Further, where only a single managerial position
is to be filled from a pool of applicants, even a showing
~

r},,UJI- h.u ~

~

of relative qualifications Jn-¥ -net be sufficient to create

"

an inference of discrimination.

A plaintiff may be

required to come forward with additional evidence that

14.

indicates that the employer's decision was based on
impermissible considerations.

A plaintiff may rely on

statistical or anecdotal evidence, or he may introduce
evidence of employment practices that contradict normal
expectations.

Thus, an employer's decision to select a

nonminority applicant, who previously had been supervised
by the minority applicant, would constitute probative
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive.

See

Burdine, supra, at 254 n. 6.
As both the Court's opinion and JUSTICE
MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion make clear, respondent
produced abundant evidence that he was at least as
qualified if not more qualified than the other applicants.
He also proved that the Postal Service repeatedly passed
over him and chose white employees who had held positions

15.

inferior to his own.

In addition, he introduced anecdotal

and statistical evidence of racial discrimination.

In my

view, there was abundant evidence to create a strong
inference of discriminatory motive.

Accordingly, I agree

that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
vacated and remanded for further consideration.
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agree, however, that resolution of the question presented
here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Respondent, who is black, applied for several
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office.
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white
applicants.
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Respondent brought this action under Title
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agree, however, that resolution of the question presented
here requires that we abandon the framework for resolving
Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

I

;

Respondent, who is black, applied for several
high level positions in the Washington D.C. Post Office.
Despite his considerable qualifications, the Postal
Service repeatedly rejected him in favor of white
applicants.

Respondent brought this action under Title

2.

VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.,

alleging that the Postal Service had discriminated against
him on account of his race.

After a full trial, the

District Court for the District of Columbia found that
respondent had failed to prove a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas since he had not shown that he was "as
qualified or more qualified" than the other candidates.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.

The Court of Appeals

reversed because the District Court had set too high a
standard.

Under its view of McDonnell Douglas, a

plaintiff automatically establishes a prima facie case
whenever he proves that he belongs to a racial minority,
that he applied for an available position for which he
possessed the "qualifications or background experiences
the employer has indicated are important," and that a

3.

nonminority applicant was selected instead. 1
1057, 1060 (CA DC 1981)

See 665 F.2d

(per curiam).

The Court--correctly I believe--rejects this
view.

See ante, at 8.

To establish a prima facie case a

Title VII plaintiff must introduce evidence that
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for
his rejection.

See Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

The most common

reasons for an employment decision, however, will vary
depending on the industry and the level of employment
.,.

involved.

Accordingly, a court must consider the type of

1 rhe Court of Appeals held initially that a Title VII
plaintiff must show only that he possessed the minimum
qualifications to perform a job. See 642 F.2d 514, 519 (CA DC
1980). We vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). 453 U.S. 902 (1981). On remand the court
adhered to its earlier holding.
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employment decision being made before it determines
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whether a plaintiff has satisfied his initial burden.
As the Court recognizes, when an employer

selects one of several qualified applicants for a high
~

level managerial position, he customarily takes into
f\

account a wide range of subjective considerations, such as
decision making ability, leadership, and ability to work
well with other employees.

See ante, at 7.

Typically, a

second variable enters into the employment decision: the
applicants who meet the employer's minimum objective
;

qualifications generally will possess varying levels of
ability.

In selecting a person to fill a high level

managerial position, it is customary for an employer to
choose the applicant who presents the optimal combination
of subjective qualifications the employer values and

...

\
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outstanding objective qualifications.

Thus, a

disappointed minority applicant who can establish only
that he met the employer's minimum objective
qualifications simply will not have eliminated the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection.

See

Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44.
Add1tionally, when only one position is open and
the employer chooses from a pool of qualified applicants,
he necessarily prefers one applicant over another.

A

choice has to be made and the . employer's isolated decision
to select a qualified n9nminority applicant rather than a
qualified minority applicant does not imply that the
choice was di scr imina tory.

Cf. Ibid. . In this respect,

"
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the decision here differs significantly from the decision
in McDonnell Douglas.

In that case the employer rejected

6.
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a qualified minority applicant but left the position
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unfilled and continued to seek~

fied applicants.

See

"
411 U.S., at 802.

Because the employer's decision in

McDonnell Douglas was facially inconsistent with its own
economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was
rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination."

Burdine, supra, at

253.

Thus to the extent the Court holds that the
Court of Appeals set too low a standard for this type of
employment decision, I agree with its reasoning.

The

~

.,.

Court, however, does not go on to specify the proof that
would be sufficient to create a prima facie case in this
context.
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It determines instead that the prima facie case,
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and the entire McDonnell Dou las framework, are
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inapplicable to manageria
The reasons for
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h.Js conclusion are difficult to

The Court draws a distinction between eviden e

that establishes a "McDonnell Douglas presumption"
evidence that establishes an "inference of
discrimination."
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Under its view, a McDonnell Douglas

presumption arises only when proof of the "st~
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prima facie case" eliminates the most common

I

nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's decision.
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If

it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption
of discrimination.

Ibid.

In these situations, the Court

would require a plaintiff instead to introduce facts that
create an "inference" of discrimination and "prove [his]
case in the ordinary way."

,·~

.

Ibid.

In my view, the
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distinction the Court draws between a standardized prima
facie case and facts that create an inference of
discrimination is neither required nor justified by our
past cases.

II

In Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 {1981), we reaffirmed unanimously
the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof
;

initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
by the preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection.'
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third,
should the defendant carry this burden, the
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were

9.

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination." 450 U.S., at 252-253.

This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be
proved--whether the challenged employment decision was in
fact discriminatory.

The prima facie case, the initial

step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to
raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. 2
id., at 253-254.
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10.

In many cases, a plaintiff may satisfy his
initial burden by proving~

four factors noted in

I\

McDonnell Douglas.

See 411 U.S., at 802.

But we have

never held that proof of these factors automatically
establishes a prima facie case.

The facts in each case

will vary and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell
Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations."
n. 13.

See id., at 802

As we stated in Teamsters v. United States,

"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas
articulation of the prima facie case] lies, not
in its specification of the discrete elements of ~;
proof there required, but in its recognition of
the general principle that any Title VII
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based
on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the
Act." 431 U.S., at 358.

Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the
particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's

11.

proof raises an inference of discrimination.

When a

plaintiff has met this initial burden, he "in effect
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against [him]."

Id., at 254.

As we

explained in Burdine, this presumption is primarily an
evidentiary device for allocating intermediary burdens of
proof.

It shifts the burden of production to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
his decision.

See id., at 255, n. 8.

Contrary to the Court'

~
make

Ha(..
clear that prima facie
-'\
rigid, standardized test.

be a
See Furnco Construction Corp.

v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).

!Pfley

e'"Stablish that

tbe r€qttireme~ts gf ~he..p~ima f.acie case wiJl vaE-y in
accordance witb e°Re faots gf ea-e.b caet.

Nor does the

12.

Court's distinction between evidence that gives rise to an
inference of discrimination and that which gives rise to a

5~

prima facie case find support in our precedent. ~fhe two
I\

concepts io ~

d are interrelated.

Evidence that gives

rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case and shift the burden of
production to the employer.

See Burdine, supra, at 254;

Furnco, supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358.

III

In my view, the proper method of analysis--and
the one ~

t consistent with our past opinions--is to
~

adapt the prima facie case to the particular employment
'\

decision being made.

As discussed above there are two

13.

considerations here that require modification of the
typical McDonnell Douglas factors.

In a case such as

this, where only a single executive position is to be
I

I

)

filled, the elements of a prima facie case--in addition to

I
the applicable ones of McDonnell Douglas--include a
showing that the plaintiff is at least as well qualified
as the person who was given the promotion.

Absent such a

showing, a Title VII plaintiff will not have eliminated
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his
rejection.
Further, where only a single managerial position
is to be filled from a pool of applicants, even a showing
of relative qualifications may not be sufficient to create
· an inference of discrimination.

A plaintiff may be

required to come forward with additional evidence that

14.

indicates that the employer's decision was based on
impermissible considerations.

A plaintiff may rely on

statistical or anecdotal evidence, or he may introduce
evidence of employment practices that contradict normal

l

expectations.

Thus, an employer's decision to select a

nonminority applicant, who previously had been supervised

i

I

I

by the minority applicant, would constitute probative
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive.

See

Burdine, supra, at 254 n. 6.
As both the Court's opinion and JUSTICE
MARSHALL's dissenting opinion make clear, respondent

I
J

I

produced abundant evidence that he was at least as
qualified if not more qualified than the other applicants.
He also proved that the Postal Service repeatedly passed
over him and chose white employees who had held positions

15.

inferior to his own.

In addition, he introduced anecdotal

and statistical evidence of racial discrimination.

In my

view, there was abundant evidence to create a strong
inference of discriminatory motive.

Accordingly, I agree

that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
vacated and remanded for further consideration.

-

.,r-.

.
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RIVESA SALLY-POW

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Rives

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Feb. 3, 1983

Aikens
I
Jan. 31.

have

now read with some care your

draft of

It is evident that you have devoted a great deal

of thought to the case,

and it may be that there is no

clearer way to write out our position.
I
force

of

must

the

say,

however,

opinion will

be

that I
clear

to

do not

think

the casual

the
type

reading often done by courts and lawyers.
Our basic difficulty with the Court's opinion is
that

it appears to scrap -

as you state in the opening
;

paragraph - the framework of analysis established by prior
cases.

As indicated in my memorandum to Justice Rehnquist

of December 29, it seems to me that his rejection focuses
on the term "presumption" as used particularly in Burdine.
If I understand it correctly, he thinks a prima facie case
under

the McDonnell/Burdine

forumla

results

the burden of going forward and nothing more.

in

shifting
Perhaps I

should not have used the term "presumption", although as

2.

we

have

agreed

the

term

serves

merely

the

evidentiary

purpose of shifting this burden.
Rather
prefers

to

hold

than

agreeing

that

the

to

this,

WHR

McDonnell/Burdine

apparently
pr ima

facie

case reasoning does not apply at all to situations where a
single managerial position is to be filled.
Part II of your draft says pretty much all of
this.

My

difficulty

summarizing

the

facts,

with

the

draft

and setting

is Part I.

After

forth very well what

should be considered where a managerial position is open,
you address the Court's distinction "between evidence that
establishes a McDonnell/Douglas presumption and evidence
that establishes an "inference of discrimination".
p. 7)

(draft

Then you say:
"Under the this, a McDonnell-Douglas presumption
arises only when proof of the 'standardized ~;
pr ima facie case' eliminates the most common
non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's
decision.
If it does not, a plaintiff is not
entitled to a presumption of discrimination.
In
these situations, the Court would require a
plaintiff instead to introduce facts that create
an 'inference' of discrimination and 'prove his
case in the ordinary way'".
This simply is not clear to me, perhaps because

I have not reread Rehnquist's opinion and do not know what
he means

by a

"standardized prima

facie

case".

In any

3.

event, I would like for you to educate me on this part of
the draft.
I

particularly would like for you to consider a

different

arrangement.

After

introduction

an

Perhaps
(that

it could

I

may

be

as

dictate),

follows:

move

your

present Part I I to the front of our opinion as a Part I
before stating any facts.

-

You might preface what you have

written with a sentence to the effect that it is well to
summarize

the

cases

that

have

established

a

consistent

analytical approach to Title VII employment and promotion
cases.
Then Part I I could apply the analysis to this
case, recognizing that only two of the specific McDonnell
factors apply.
said

We could state what you and I

(see my rider)

both have

as to what properly may be considered

by an employer when filling a single executive position.
A brief Part I I I could address WHR's rejection
of the Court's prior analysis.
this is difficult to "fathom".

As you say, why he does

I simply do not understand

it.
The

last part could

be

lines of a rider I have dictated.

* * *

quite

brief

along

the

4.

I do not want to make a major production out of
this.

You have an important Court opinion to write.

You

might put Aikens aside until you get a draft of the Court
opinion; though we must circulate this Aikens opinion no
later than Tuesday February 15 so that Rehnquist will have
a chance to reply before the Friday Conference.
A fall back position, Rives, is simply to state
that

I

write separately because

understanding

of

the

I

do not agree with my

reasoning of

the Court's opinion.

Then say that I nevertheless do not read its opinion as
rejecting the consistent approach to these cases carefully
developed in our precedents.

I would summarize the prior

precedents as you have done and apply the basic analysis
to the particular facts of this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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draft
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you address the Court's distinction "between evidence that
establishes a McDonnell/Douglas presumption and evidence
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(draft
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"Under the this, a McDonnell-Douglas presumption
arises only when proof of the 'standardized : '
pr ima f acie case' eliminates the most common
non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's
decision.
If it does not, a plaintiff is not
entitled to a presumption of discrimination.
In
these situations, the Court would require a
plaintiff instead to introduce facts that create
an 'inference' of discrimination and 'prove his
case in the ordinary way'".
This simply is not clear to me, perhaps because

I have not reread Rehnquist's opinion and do not know what
he means

by a

"standardized prima

facie

case".

In any

3.

event, I would like for you to educate me on this part of
the draft.
I
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different

arrangement.

After

introduction

an
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cases

that

have
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a

consistent

analytical approach to Title VII employment and promotion
cases.
Then Part I I could apply the analysis to this
case, recognizing that only two of the specific McDonnell
factors apply.
said

We could state what you and I

(see my rider)

both have

as to what properly may be considered
'

;

by an employer when filling a single executive position.
A brief Part I I I could address WHR's rejection
of the Court's prior analysis.
this is difficult to "fathom".
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I simply do not understand

it.
The

last part could

be

lines of a rider I have dictated.
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quite

brief

along
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I do not want to make a major production out of
this.

You have an important Court opinion to write.

You

might put Aikens aside until you get a draft of the Court
opinion; though we must circulate this Aikens opinion no
later than Tuesday February 15 so that Rehnquist will have
a chance to reply before the Friday Conference.
A fall back position, Rives, is simply to state
that

I

write separately because

understanding

of

Then say that I

the

reasoning

I

do not agree with my

of

the Court's opinion.

nevertheless do not read its opinion as

rejecting the consistent approach to these cases carefully
developed in our precedents.

I would summarize the prior

precedents as you have done and apply the basic analysis
to the particular facts of this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I join the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, adding only a comment
on my understanding of

the proof necessary to establish a pr ima

facie case of racial discrimination in hiring or promotion under
Title VII.
Green,

As I

411 U.S.

understand
792

(1973),

the

reach

of McDonnell Douglas v.

it provides a rough, flexible guide

for all Title VII cases of the amount and type of proof that an
individual plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment.

As a general reformulation of the McDonnell

Douglas factors, applicable to all plaintiffs alleging discrimination in hiring or promotion, one could say that the plaintiff
in a Title VII
proof
802;

(i)

action would establish a

prima

facie case

"that he belongs to a racial minority,"

upon

411 U.S., at

(ii) that he applied for a job and possessed objective qual-

ifications fairly comparable to other applicants that merited the
employer's serious consideration;
fications, he was rejected

(iv)

(iii)

that, despite his quali-

under circumstances that, absent

other explanation,

eliminate the most common legitimate reasons

for his rejection.

See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,

358, n. 44 (1977).

This fourth factor is flexible, and the show-

ing it requires depends on the circumstances of
case.

In McDonnell Douglas

mained open was sufficient,
tors,

to establish a

prima

itself,

the particular

a showing that the job re-

in combination with the other facf acie case.

As JUSTICE POWELL sug-

gests, ante, at 7, a showing that the employer promoted a subordinate

instead of

the plaintiff may satisfy this final element.

Statistical or anecdotal evidence is also relevant.

-

2 -

""

It appears clear from the record here that respondent made
more than an ample showing

to establish a prima facie case.

I

agree with JUSTICE POWELL, however, that resolution of this factual question is more appropriately left to the courts below.

I

therefore concur that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration.

lfp/ss 02/03/83

Rider A, p. 11 (Aikens)

AIKENS11 SALLY-POW
The foregoing line of cases establishes a
framework of reasoning that has been applied in each of our
prior decisions.

In should be applied in the present case.

As the Court notes, two of the specific factors identified
·~

in McDonnell-Douglas are not present where a sinqle
•

executive position is to be filled.

Yet, the burden remains

on the plaintiff to produce evidence that gives rise to an
inference of discrimination.

If so, he has created a prima

facie case shifting the burden of production to the
employer.

On the facts of record here, it is clear that

respondent produced abundant evidence to make out a prima
facie case.

He proved that the Postal Service had

repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employees who
had held positions subordinate to his own.

In addition, he

introduced anectdotal and statistical evidence of racial

.

'

I<,'

l

...
2.
discrimination.

rn

my view, his evidence created more than

an inference of discriminatory motivP.
with the judgment of the Court .

Accordingly, I agree

Rider A, p. 11 (Aikens)
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The

foregoing

line

of

cases

establishes

framework of reasoning that has been applied
our prior decisions.
case.

As

identified
single

the

a

in each of

In should be applied in the present

Court notes,

two of

the

specific

factors

in McDonnell-Douglas are not present where a

executive

position

is

to

be

filled.

Yet,

the

burden remains on the plaintiff to produce evidence that
gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

If so, he

has created a prima facie case that shifts the burden of
production to the employer.

On the facts of record here,

it is clear that respondent produced abundant evidence to
make out a pr ima facie case.
qualifications,

he

proved

In addition to impressive

that

the

Postal

Service

had
;

repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employees who
had held positions subordinate to his own.

In addition,

he

evidence

introduced

anectdotal

racial discrimination.
more

than

an

and

statistical

In my view,

inference

of

of

his evidence created

discriminatory

motive.

Accordingly, I agree with the judgment of the Court.

lfp/ss 02/03/83m

Rider A, p. 4 (Aikens)

AIKENS4 SALLY-POW

As the Court recognizes, when an employer
selects one of several qualified applicants for a high
level managerial position, the sitaution is quite
different from the employment decision that is made in
cases such as McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine.

Whether

minimum objective qualifications is merely the threshold
inquiry.

Normally, an employer wishes to fill managerial

positions with the best qualified applicant.

And making a
;

fair and intelligent judgment may require a weighing of
qualities not always apparent from information of record.
For example, consideration normally would be given to an
applicant's leadership qualities and ability to work well
with others.

Depending upon the level and authority of

2.

the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound
decisions could be critical.
Additionally, when there are several fully
qualified applicants who can be viewed as satisfying all
of the foregoing factors, the employer necessarily must
prefer one applicant over others.

A choice has to be

made, and thus an employer's decision to select a
qualified non-minority applicant does not imply that the
choice was discriminatory.
n. 44.

See Teamsters, supra, at 358

In this respect, the decision here differs

significantly from the decision in McDonnell-Douglas.

In

that case, where a non-managerial job was open, the
employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left
the position unfilled and continued to seek qualified
applicants.

See 411 U.S., at 802.

Because the employer's

3.

decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic
self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected
under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination."

Burdine, supra, at 253.

In

view of the foregoing considerations, I agree that the
Court of Appeals applied a standard that is wholly
inapplicable to this type of employment decision.

My

difficulty with the Court's opinion is that it appears to
reject, as inapplicable to managerial decisions, the prima
facie case analysis and the entire McDonnell-Douglas
framework.
The reasons for this apparent rejection of our
precedents are difficult to fathom.

The Court draws a

distinction between evidence that establishes a
"McDonnell-Douglas presumption" and evidence that

4.

establishes an "inference of discrimination", a
distinction not heretofore drawn.

Under the Court's view,

a McDonnell-Douglas presumption arises only when proof of
the "standardized prima facie case" eliminates the most
common non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's
decision.

If it does not, a plaintiff is not entitled to

a presumption of discrimination.

Rider A, p. 4 (Aikens)
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considerations,
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that the Court of Appeals applied a standard that simply
does not apply to this
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[February - , 1983)

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court, as its reasoning
appears to depart from the consistent approach to Title VII
cases that our precedents have developed. The Court apparently perceives a distinction between evidence that establishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U. S. 792 (1973), and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination. See ante, 9-11. If a plaintiff is able
to make out a prima facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination" that shifts the burden of production in
accordance with the analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. See id., at 9-10. If, however, a plaintiff
can prove only an "inference of discrimination," the Court apparently would find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. See id., at 10. In my view, the distinction the
Court perceives finds no support in our precedents-precedents that I do not understand the Court to reject. Instead,
our cases make clear that evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. They do not indicate, as the Court suggests, that the
McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable to the type of
employment decision presented here.

;

81-1044-CONCUR
2

U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS

I
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in
McDonnell Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450
U. S., at 252-253.
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be provedwhether the challenged employment decision was in fact discriminatory. See id., at 253.
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at
802. · But we have never held that proof of these factors
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in
each case will vary and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell Douglas will not be "necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations." See id., at 802, n. 13;
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431
u. s. 324 (1977):

81-1044-CONCUR
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVS. v. AIKENS

3

"the "importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation
of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act." Id., at 358.
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises
an inference of discrimination. When a plaintiff has met this
initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]." Id., at
254. As we explained in Burdine, this presumption is primarily an evidentiary device for allocating intermediate burdens of proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for his decision.* See id., at 255, n. 8.
As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinction between evidence that establishes an inference of dis*The Court seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of discrimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981). See ante, at 11. In my view, the Court reads too much into this
footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie case" has been
used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may refer either to the
level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a directed verdict or to
an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of production to the defendant.
Footnote 7 only stands for the proposition-a proposition that should have
been evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell
Douglas-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of production. As we subsequently explained, "the term 'presumption' properly
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden." See
Burdine, SU'{Yr'a, at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9 (2d ed. 1977)).
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crimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated.
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden
of production to the employer. See Burdine, supra, at 254;
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978); Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical framework
has been applied consistently both by this Court and the
lower courts. Departing from it would create uncertainty
and invite litigation.
II
As the Court notes, t:wo of tae-speeific-faetol!S-i4mtified-in---Mc.Donnell Douglas are absent where a single executive position is to be.Jllled from a pool of qualified of applicants.
See ante, at ~- When an employer selects one of several
(_ - qualified applicants' for a high level managerial position, the
situation is quite different from the employment decision that
is made in cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.
Whether an applicant possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the threshold inquiry. Normally, an employer wishes to fill managerial positions with the most qualified applicant. And making a fair and intelligent judgment
may require a weighing of qualities not always apparent from
information of record. For example, consideration normally
would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities and ability to work well with others. Depending upon the level and
authority of the position, the capacity of the applicant to
make sound decisions could be critical.
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors,
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over others. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's decision to select a qualified non-minority applicant does not necessarily imply that the choice was discriminatory. See
Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44. In this respect, the decision

;
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here differs significantly from the decision in McDonnellDouglas. In that case, where a non-managerial job was
open, the employer rejected a qualified minority applicant
but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other applicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under
circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253.
Thus, in the context of a high level managerial employment
decision, a minority plaintiff who seeks to raise an inference
of discrimination must prove more than that he was qualified
and that a nonminority applicant was selected for the position. t No purpose would be served by trying to specify in
advance the evidence that will be sufficient to satisfy this initial burden. Each case must be judged on its own facts
within the established analytical framework. See Burdine,
supra, at 252-253. It is necessary also to keep in mind that
the burden imposed by the prima facie case requirement need
not be onerous. Id., at 253.
On the facts of record in this case, it is clear that respondent produced abundant evidence to make out a prima facie
case. In addition to impressive qualifications, he proved

t JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an employer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white applicant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the]
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8.
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff must establish an inference
of discrimination initially. Only after this inference is established does the
burden shift to the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Burdine, supra, at
254; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973).
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that the Postal Service had passed over him repeatedly and
chosen white applicants who had held positions subordinate
to his own. In addition, he introduced anecdotal and statistical evidence of racial discrimination. In my view, respondent's evidence created more than an inference of discriminatory motive. Accordingly, I agree with the judgment of the
Court.

.,n

;
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II

In this case, the District Court for the
District of Columbia found that respondent had not
established a prima facie case since he had failed to
prove the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors.

1

1 In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case by showing:
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that,
despite
his
qualifications,
he
was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications."
411 U.S., at
802.

;

We noted, however, that this model would vary iccording to
the facts and circumstances of each case.
See id., at
802, n. 13.

.~

I

2.

He had not shown that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the individuals who were promoted.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.

See

The Court of Appeals reversed

because the District Court had set too high a standard.
See 665 F.2d 1057, 1060 (1982)

(per curiam).

Although it

recognized that "Title VII cases involving professional
and managerial positions raise uniquely difficult issues
not found in cases involving lower-level jobs," it held
that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell Douglas
factor by showing that he "possesses whatever
;

qualifications or background experiences the employer has
indicated are important."

Ibid.

Since the court viewed

the other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been
established, 2 it remanded for further consideration of

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

3.

respondent's qualifications in light of its articulation
of the applicable standard.
In my view, the proof required by the Court of
Appeals is insufficient to raise an inference of
discrimination where a single executive position is to be
filled from a pool of qualified applicants.

When an

employer selects an applicant for a managerial or
professional position, the situation is quite different
from the employment decision made in cases such as
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.

Whether an applicant
,

,,.

possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the

2The
Court
of
Appeals
initially
had
found
that
respondent had proved each of the four McDonnell Douglas
factors.
See Aikens v. United States Postal Service, 642
F.2d 514, 517 {CADC 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S.
902 {1981).
On remand, the court apparently adhered to
its earlier etermination that the other three factors had
been proved as it remanded to the District Court only for
reconsider tion of the second factor.

4.

threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the
minimum requirements normally will present an employer
with a wide range of qualifications and credentials.

An

employer of course will wish to fill the position with the
most qualified applicant.

Yet making a fair and

intelligent judgment may require a weighing of qualities
not always apparent from information of record.

For

example, consideration normally would be given to an
applicant's leadership qualities and ability to work well
with others.

Depending upon the level and authority of
;

the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound
decisions could be critical.
Additionally, when there are several qualified
applicants who can be viewed as satisfying all of the
foregoing factors, the employer necessarily must prefer

5.

one applicant over others.

A choice has to be made, and

thus an employer's decision to select a qualified nonminorit~person lfrom a pool of applicants does not
necessarily imply that the choice was discriminatory.
Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44.

See

In this respect, this

case differs significantly McDonnell Douglas, where the
employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left
the position unfilled and continued to seek other
applicants.

See 411 U.S., at 802.

Because the employer's

decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic
,

self interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected
under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination."

Burdine, supra, at 253.

No

similar inference can be drawn in this case where the job
was not left open.

I •

6.

The employment decision at issue here
illustrates what our cases consistently have recognized:
the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case will
vary from the model set forth in McDonnell Douglas
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.

See Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 6; McDonnell

Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13.

This does not mean,

however, as the Court seems to believe, that the McDonnell

WI/(

,t

Douglas factors ar-e. nd le,nger relevant in determining

"

whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of
;

discrimination.

They continue to provide a rough guide to

the type of evidence that a plaintiff must introduce.
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative

1
I

lack of qualifications" prevents him from being seriously
,,.....J fl. *"" I 1-- C. C . h.

T

considered for a position, there would be little reason to

If

7.

infer that the employer rejected him for discriminatory
reasons.

See Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44.

As noted

above, in the context of a managerial or professional

7

position, a plaintiff must possess at least ~ elativ~'-.l

--/-~~'4-,

fJ

/

o~.tr/

objective qualifications to be considered seriously and7

.
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~~roof of these qualifications normally will be a predicate
I ~

to establishing a prima facie case.
/

, ,) ~ I ~

It is trueJ that ~

r.2-~~,..h-£-t"-' .,,

employer may have legitimate subjective reasons for
.I

preferring one applicant over another, {§__ut a plaintiff's
showing of relative objective qualifications goes far
;

towards raising an inference of discriminatio~

Moreover,

we have recognized that a plaintiff normally must adduce
additional evidence that demonstrates that he "was
rejected under circumstances which give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination."

See Burdine,

I

8.

supra, at 253.

When the position does not remain open, as

it did in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may introduce
other evidence that indicates that the employer's decision
.,.__ ll- (.,.-., -C:. G·-e..-• , : , '"
,...

. ,._

cl"-"

t.

...

-!.- {

'",.

'
departs from the course that1, normally. would
be expected of
a rational, nondiscriminatory businessman.
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to
determining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie
case; they were never intended to establish an inflexible
rule.

Each case must be assessed in light of its own

particular facts to determine if a plaintiff has
;

introduced evidence that raises an inference of
discrimination.

In this case, respondent produced

- ~ ~,l
f
abundant evidence to show tha t h ( was at least as
! ~
• 1 q~A,..(

qualified as the individualj who were Mired.

r--

I ·~'"'-''7

He also

proved that the Postal Service had passed over him

I

(

~~k

9.

91--/ ~)~~
~~o/~~
a '-L,.,-t.e. _..,,/ , tA.AJ M ·
'./- ,,, ~.L,
repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had held

"")

positions subordinate to his own--an apparent departure
from the normal course of business.

In addition,

respondent introduced an cdotal and statistical evidence
of racial discrimination.

~R-t~

m ~ Q U g h evid.......,_1'o~ stablish~

appe-ar,s-to. be

prima facie case,

of this factual question is more appropriately
left to the courts below.

Accordingly, I agree that the

Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated and the case
remanded for further consideration.
;

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court, as its reasoning
departs from the consistent approach to Title VII cases that
our precedents have developed. The Court apparently perceives a distinction between evidence that establishes a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U. S. 792 (1973), and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination. See ante, 9-11. If a plaintiff is able
to make out a prima facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination" that shifts the burden of production in
accordance with the analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. See id., at 9-10. If, however, a plaintiff
can prove only an "inference of discrimination," the Court apparently would find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. See id., at 10. In my view, the Court's distinction
finds no support in our precedents. Instead, our cases make
clear that evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. They
do not indicate, as the Court suggests, that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is inapplicable to the type of employment
decision presented here.

I
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

;
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450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in
McDonnell Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450
U. S., at 252-253.
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be provedwhether the challenged employment decision was in fact discriminatory. See id., at 253.
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at
802. But we have never held that proof of these factors
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in
each case will vary, and the prima facie proof specified in McDonnell Douglas is not "necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13; see
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431
u. s. 324 (1977):
"The importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation
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of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act." Id., at 358.
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises
an inference of discrimination. 1 When a plaintiff has met
this initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]."
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. This presumption is primarily
an evidentiary device for allocating intermediate burdens of
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 2 See id., at 255 and n. 8.
'JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an employer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white applicant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the]
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8.
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff initially must establish an
inference of discrimination. Only then does the burden shift to the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792, 802 (1973).
2
The Court seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of discrimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in
Burdine, supra. See ante, at 11. In my view, the Court reads too much
into this footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie case"
has been used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may refer
either to the level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a directed
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As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinction between evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated.
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden
of production to the employer. See id., at 254; Furnco,
supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical
framework has been applied consistently both by this Court
and the lower courts. Departing from it would create uncertainty and invite litigation.
II
In this case, the District Court found that respondent had
not established a prima facie case since he had failed to prove
the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. 3 He had
not shown that he was "as qualified or more qualified" than
the individuals who were promoted. See Aikens v. Bolger,
Civ. Action No. 77-0303 (DDC Feb. 26, 1979). The Court of
Appeals reversed because the District Court had set too high
verdict or to an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of production to
the defendant. Footnote 7 stands only for the proposition-a proposition
evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of production. As we subsequently explained, "'[t]he word "presumption" properly
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden.' " See
Burdine, su'{J1'a, at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, p. 255 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted)).
3
In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case by showing:
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.'' 411 U. S., at 802.
We noted, however, that this model would vary according to the facts and
circumstances of each case. See id., at 802, n. 13.
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a standard. See 665 F. 2d 1057, 1060 (CADC 1982) (per
curiam). Although it recognized that "Title VII cases involving professional and managerial positions raise uniquely
difficult issues not found in cases involving lower-level jobs,"
it held that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell
Douglas factor by showing that he "possesses whatever
qualifications or background experiences the employer has
indicated are important." Ibid. Since the court viewed the
other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been established, 4 it remanded for further consideration of respondent's
qualifications in light of its articulation of the applicable
standard.
In my view, the proof required by the Court of Appeals is
insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination where a
single executive position is to be filled from a pool of qualified
applicants. When an employer selects an applicant for a
managerial or professional position, the situation is quite different from the employment decision made in cases such as
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Whether an applicant
possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the
threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the minimum
requirements normally will present an employer with a wide
range of qualifications and credentials. A:i;t"responsible employer of course will wish to fill the position with the best
qualified applicant. Yet making a fair and intelligent judgment may require a weighing of qualities not always apparent from information of record. For example, consideration
normally would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities
• The Court of Appeals initially had found that respondent had proved
each of the four McDonnell Douglas factors . See Aikens v. United States
Postal Service , 642 F. 2d 514, 517-518 (CADC 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand from this Court, the Court of
Appeals apparently adhered to its earlier determination that the other
three factors had been proved, as it remanded to the District Court only
for reconsideration of the second factor.
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and ability to work well with others. Depending upon the
level and authority of the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound decisions could be critical.
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors,
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over others. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's decision to select a qualified non-minority person from a pool of
applicants does not necessarily imply that the choice was discriminatory. See Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. In this
respect, this case differs significantly from McDonnell Douglas, where the employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other
applicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self
interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. No similar inference
can be drawn in this case where the job was not left open.
The employment decision at issue here illustrates what our
cases consistently have recognized: the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case will vary from the model set forth in
McDonnell Douglas depending on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. See Burdine, supra, at 253, n.
6; McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. This does not
mean, however, as the Court seems to believe, that the McDonnell Douglas factors are no longer relevant in determining whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimination. They continue to provide a rough guide to the type of
evidence that a plaintiff must introduce.
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative lack of qualifications" prevents him from being seriously considered for a position, see Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44, there would be
little reason to infer that the employer rejected him for discriminatory reasons. As noted above, to be seriously consid-
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ered for a managerial or professional position, a plaintiff
must at least possess objective qualifications that are fairly
comparable to those of the other applicants. Proof of these
qualifications normally will be a predicate to establishing a
prima facie case. We have emphasized, however, that
establishing such a case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that he "was rejected under circumstances which give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination." See Burdine,
supra, at 253. This often will require a plaintiff to introduce
additional evidence. 5 If, for example, the position remains
unfilled, as in McDonnell Douglas, this could be viewed as a
departure from conduct ordinarily expected of an employer,
giving rise to such an inference.

III
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to determining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie case; they
were never intended to establish an inflexible rule. Each
case must be assessed in light of its own particular facts to
determine if a plaintiff has introduced evidence that raises an
inference of discrimination. In this case, respondent produced abundant evidence to show objectively that he was at
least as qualified as the individuals who were given the positions. He also proved that the Postal Service had passed
over him repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had
held positions subordinate to his own-an apparent departure from the normal course of business. In addition, respondent introduced anecdotal and statistical evidence of racial discrimination. It appears to be clear that an inference
5
As indicated above, an employer-in filling a managerial or professional position-often will have legitimate, subjective business reasons for
preferring one applicant over another. See infra, a t - . Where these
reasons are known only to the employer, as frequently will be the case,
they must be brought out by the employer after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
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of discrimination arises from this evidence, establishing a
prima facie case. But resolution of this factual question is
more appropriately left to the courts below. Accordingly, I
agree that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated
and the case remanded for further consideration.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnqui!'-t
Justice Stevens

Justice O'Connor
1 EB 2 2 1983
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UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER, v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I join the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, adding only a comment on my understanding of the proof necessary to establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring or promotion under Title VII. As I understand the reach of M cDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), it provides a
rough, flexible guide for all Title VII cases of the amount and
type of proof that an individual plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. As a general
reformulation of the McDonnell Douglas factors, applicable
to all plaintiffs alleging discrimination in hiring or promotion,
one could say that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would establish a prima facie case upon proof (i) "that he belongs to a
racial minority," 411 U. S., at 802; (ii) that he applied for a
job and possessed objective qualifications fairly comparable
to other applicants that merited the employer's serious consideration; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected (iv) under circumstances that, absent other explanation, eliminate the most common legitimate reasons for his
rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324,
358, n. 44 (1977). This fourth factor is flexible, and the
showing it requires depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In McDonnell Douglas itself, a showing that
the job remained open was sufficient, in combination with the
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other factors, to establish a prima facie case. As JUSTICE
suggests, ante, at 7, a showing that the employer
promoted a subordinate instead of the plaintiff may satisfy
this final element. Statistical or anecdotal evidence is also
relevant. S~t. al~ "feta~ ~Nftltt?t ~~mmuni4v ~,·rs v, furd1',,,e 460 IJ. 5, ,;.I/,~ ~3 (l'l(I).
It appears clear from the record here that respondent 'J
made more than an ample showing to establish a prima facie
case. I agree with JUSTICE POWELL, however, that resolution of this factual question is more appropriately left to the
courts below. I therefore concur that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case remanded
for further consideration.
POWELL

f~rttttt ~l1ttrt of tqt 1itnUth Jhttt~

Jht#ftittgton. J. ~. 2.llffeJt'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 23, 1983

No. 81-1044

U. S. Postal Service Bd. of Gov.
v. Aikens

Dear Lewis,
I plan to join your separate opinion in
this case. Do you have any objection to my
supplemental explanation as set forth in the
attached draft? I do not want to take liberties
with what I understand to be your view.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Enclosure

February 24, 1983

81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

John:

I am glad that you are talking to Bill Rehnquist
hope of making changes in his opi.nion that would
a Court. ~his would he constructive.

My efforts in this respect, both verbally and by
the enclosed memo of December 29, were not fruitful. But
these occurred before it was clear that Bill's views would
not be acceptable to four other Justices.

·t.

My memo, of course, is not as detailed or carefully thought out as the opinion I have circulated. It does
identify the concerns that I brought to Bill's attention
some time ago - verbally as well as in the memo.
I should add that Sandra showed me her opinion
before she circulated it. She views it as consist~nt with
mine, and thinks it would be helpful to trial courts to have
brief summry of the appropriate analysis.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
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February 25, 1983

Re:

81-1044 - United States Postal Service
v. Aikens

Dear Lewis:
This morning I spent a good deal of time reviewing
the Burdine opinion and the various circulations in
this case. I gather that all of us in the majority
agree that when the four factors specifically outlined
in the McDonnell Douglas opinion are present, these
consequences result:
(1) Plaintiff's evidence raises an inference of
discrimination;
(2) That evidence establishes a prima facie case;
and
{3) If that evidence is unrebutted, judgment must
be entered for plaintiff.
We also all agree that this case does not fit
precisely into the McDonnell Douglas four-factor
formula because the job did not remain open after
plaintiff's application was rejected. We apparently
also all agree that there is enough evidence in the
record to support a judgment for the plaintiff if the
District Court makes the proper findings, and we also
agree that as appellate judges we cannot resolve the
factual questions ourselves. In other words, none of
us is prepared to say that judgment should be entered
in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law. It seems to
me that our area of agreement is broad enough to enable
us to fashion a consensus on an opinion.
Where we part company, as I understand the
writing, is on the question whether in Title VII
litigation there is any difference between an

•

'

'

.
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"inference of discrimination" and a "presumption" that
requires that judgment be entered in favor of the
plaintiff if the presumption is unrebutted. You
emphasize the function of the presumption as a
procedural, burden-shifting device. Bill, on the other
hand, focuses on the substantive character of the
presumption if the plaintiff's evidence is not
rebutted. I am persuaded that there is not any
necessary conflict between your two positions, although
you may use the word "inference" differently.

-

)

$

If a case fits precisely into the McDonnell
Douglas four-factor formula, I think Bill agrees with
you that the burden shifts to the employer. I think,
however, that you agree with him that if the McDonnell
Douglas "presumption" (or "inference") is unrebutted,
judgment must be entered for the plaintiff.
If a case does not satisfy all four McDonnell
Douglas factors, Bill says--as I understand him--that
the question whether plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case depends on the stren th of the inferences to
be drawn from the plaintiff's evidence, andt hat- The
job of drawing those inferences is one that should
initially be performed by the trial judge. You seem to
say--and please correct me if I am wrong--that whenever
the plaintiff's evidence raises an "inference of
discrimination", he has made out a prima facie case
which entitles him to judgment if that inference is not
rebutted. In other words, any "inference of
discrimination" no matter how slight has the same legal
consequences as the McDonnell Douglas presumption.
Let me suggest a hypothetical case that may
identify the linguistic problem that seems to be
present. Assume that a Title VII plaintiff has sued
the estate of a deceased employer and therefore the
defense counsel was simply unable to adduce any
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's case. The
plaintiff's case consists of proof: (1) that she is a
woman; (2) that she is a lawyer well qualified to work
as a law clerk; (3) that a judge each year hires three
applicants; (4) that in the year in question two male
and two female lawyers applied and the employer hired
two males and one female and rejected the plaintiff.

'?

)
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Facts of this kind might establish a case that could be
described in at least three different ways: (1) they do
not raise any inference of discrimination because they
are equally consistent with guilt or innocence; (2)
they raise an inference of discrimination against
female applicants but the inference is so weak that
judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant
even though the inference is unrebutted; or (3) the
inference of discrimination is so strong that judgment
must be entered in favor of the plaintiff if no
rebuttal evidence is offered.
It seems to me that Bill uses the term "inference
of discrimination" in a way that leaves room for weak
inferences that do not require the entry of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, whereas you seem to use the
term as one that compels the entry of judgment in favor
of the plaintiff whenever the inference is unrebutted.
If I am correct in identifying the point that
separates the two of you, I feel sure we can work out
language that will resolve the difference.
(Perhaps,
for example, Bill might be willing to substitute a
phrase such as "evidence of discrimination" for
"inference"--at least when he is talking about weak
inferences.) If I do not fairly understand your
position, I hope you will further enlighten me.

Justice Powell

•

L
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens

In Justice Rehnquist's second draft, he stated that the
evidence in this case was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case, but indicated that the same evidence might be sufficient to
establish an inference of discrimination.

Although the second draft

was far from clear as to when a prima facie case would be
established, it was arguable that the opinion limited McDonnell
Douglas to its facts.

Thus, when the position was not an assembly

line job or when the position did not remain open, a prima facie
case would not have been established and the McDonnell Douglas
framework would be inapplicable.
His third draft is somewhat of an improvement, hut it

;

still represents a substantial departure from McDonnell Douglas.
This new draft differs from the second in that it suggests that a
prima facie case might have been made out on the facts in this case.
See ante, at 9.

The difficulty with the third draft is that it
7

retains the , E ~ ~ ~ nference aistinction.

Thus, reading the

opinion in the most favorable light, it establishes a two-track
system.

In some cases, the same evidence will be sufficient to

establish both an inference of discrimination and a presumption of

2.

discrimination.

But in others, the evidence will be sufficient to

establish only an inference of discrimination.
This scheme has two problems.

First, it is unclear how

one distinguishes between the amount of evidence necessary for a
presumption of discrimination and that necessary for an inference of
discrimination, except that more proof is needed to establish the
former than the latter.

Because this two-tier system is

unexplained, it will create considerable uncertainty.

Second,

because it is unclear what difference exists between the two
systems, it is probable that DC's will never attempt to apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII cases.

It will be easier

for them to find simply that the plaintiff met the lower standard of
proof--that he established an inference of discrimination--and not
reach any conclusion as to the applicablity of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.

In practice, it is likely that the McDonnell Douglas

framework will remain available but simply never used.

This would

deprive the lower courts of the guidance that the McDonnell Douglas
framework provides.
I do not see that the present draft is sufficiently close ~
to warrant joining.

I have attached a copy of a draft of our

opinion revised in light of Justice Rehnquist's new draft.

I did

not see the need to make changes other than minor changes in the
wording.

The only possibility that occurred to me would be to aaa a

footnote pointing out the difficulty in distinguishing between
inferences and presumptions of discrimination.

A call could be

placed after the word "inapplicable" on the first page, the seventh
line from the bottom of the first paragraph (call marked in pencil).

3.

I have attached a draft of a proposed footnote.

I am not sure

whether this footnote is necessary or appropriate as it may look too
much as if you are heaping insult on injury since the changes that
spur the footnote were made ostensibly to accomodate vour views.

;

lfp/ss 02/28/83

EXPLAIN RIVES-POW

81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens
Dear John:
As busy as we all are with our own cases (in
addition to the general work of the Court), I particularly
appreciate your undertaking the role of "mediator" between
Bill and me.

Yet, in candor, I do not think we can get

together on the basis of the outline in your letter.
I see no reason why the Court should depart at
this late date from the basic framework of McDonnell
,.

Douglas/Burdine.

I understand and respect Bill's

differing views, but I do not agree with them.

I am

distressed also that three Justices apparently would
severely undercut existing precedents, as would be the
result of Thurgood's opinion.

Once the Court starts

2.

chipping away at the rationale of precedents, each of us
is invited to join in the process.
So much for generalities, and I turn now to
specifics.
As I read Bill's opinion, it holds that a Title
VII plaintiff may prove his case in two ways.

He may seek

to establish a prima facie case by proving the four
factors noted in McDonnell Douglas.

Proof of these

factors entitles him to a "presumption of discrimination"
and shifts the burden of production to the employer.
Where, however, "no standardized prima facie case can be
made out," a plaintiff may seek to establish an "inference
of discrimination." p. 9.

In such cases, a court would

depart from the allocation of burdens and order of proof
established in McDonnell Douglas.

3.

The distinction Bill draws between presumptions
and inferences is, at least to me, unclear.

The latest

draft of his opinion states that in this case "there may
well be additional evidence in the record" that would
'

~~~

establish a presumption, seep. 9, but it never speeifies
I\

how one determines when a presumption has been established
and when it has not.

This distinction could well confuse

lower courts as they try to decide which method of proof
is applicable to the case before them.
I agree with your statement that a plaintiff
should show more than a "weak inference of discrimination"
to establish a prima facie case.

But, it is not clear to

me that Bill's and my opinion differ significantly on this
point.

Neither of us distinguishes between weak and

strong inferences.

Each refers only to establishing an

4.

"inference of discrimination," and each entrusts this
determination to the trier of fact.

It may be true, as

you observe, that Bill's opinion would leave more room for
judges to dismiss a plaintiff's case.

But it provides no

framework for determining whether the employer has acted
for discriminatory reasons.

In this respect, it leaves

the trier of fact free to find a prima facie case when
there has been proof of only a weak inference of
discrimination.

I suppose it also would leave a court

free to reject proof as strong as that made out by Aikens.

~

My opinion,. I be] i eve, give/triers of fact s~m~
latitude in judging the strength of the inference of
discrimination to be drawn from the evidence.

At the same

time, it notes that the McDonnell Douglas factors continue
to provide a rough guide for making this determination.

5.

As the McDonnell Douglas framework provides the trial
court with both flexibility and guidance in assessing the
strength of a plaintiff's evidence, I see no reason for us
to depart from it by distinguishing between inferences and
presumptions of discrimination.
I certainly am not unmindful of the desirability
of having a Court.

Yet, I am unwilling to join an opinion

that seems to me to cast doubt as to what the Court has

;

onsiderable latitude.

Changing the framework of analys·

I have no objection, of course, to your showing
this letter to Bill.
on this case already .

He and I have had quite an exchange

6.

Sincerely,
Justice Stevens

,~
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(Aikens)

AIKENSll SALLY-POW

The
framework

foregoing

of reasoning

our prior decisions.
case.

As

identified
single

the

line

of

establishes

that has been applied

a

in each of

In should be applied in the present

Court notes,

two of

in McDonnell-Douglas

executive

cases

position

is

the

specific

factors

are not present where a
to

be

filled.

Yet,

the

burden remains on the plaintiff to produce evidence that
gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

If so, he

has created a prima facie case that shifts the burden of
production to the employer.

On the facts of record here,

it is clear that respondent produced abundant evidence to
make out a

pr ima

qualifications,

fac ie case.

he

proved

In addition to

that

the

Postal

impressive

Service

had
.,

repeatedly passed over him and chosen white employee s who
had held positions subordinate to his own.

In addition,

he

evidence

introduced

racial
more

anectdotal

discrimination.
than

an

and

statistical

In my view,

inference

of

of

his evidence created

discriminatory

motive.

Accordingly, I agree with the judgment of the Court.

J·.

i

'

..,.

February 28, 1983

j

81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

fiP

: .~
·'th

1~: r.· J{',

'.I

"'

Dear John:
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As busy as we all are with our own cases (in acaition to the general work of the Court), I oarticularly appreciate your undertakinq the role of "mediator" between
Bill and me. Yet, in candor, I do not think we can get together on the basis of the outline in your l~tter.
I see no reason why the Court should depart at
this late date from the basic framework of McDonnell Douglas/Burdine. t understand and respect Bill's differing
views, but I do not agree with them. I am distressed also
that three Justices apparently would severely undercut existing precedents, as would be the result of Thurgood's
opinion. Once the Court starts chipping away at the rationale of precedents, each of us is invited to join in the
process. .
1,.,,

~·

.;

So much for qeneralities, and I turn now to

specifics. ,,
.,,.<
'I..

,,,. "' :,· 'll¥

As I read Bill's opinion, it holds that a Title
VII plaintiff may prove his case in two ways. He may seek ~
to establish a prima facie case by proving the four factorq
noted in McDonnell Douglas. Proof of these factors entitles
him to a "Presumption of discrimination" and shifts the burden of production to the employer. Where, however, "no
standardized prima facie case can be made out," a plaintiff
may seek to establish an "inference of discrimination." p.
9-10. In such cases, a court would depart from the allocation of burdens and order of proof established in McDonnell
Douglas.

'i'he distinction Bill <!raws between presumptions
and inferences is, at least to me, unclear. The latest
draft of his opinion states that in this case "there may
well be additional evidence in the record" that would establish a presumption, seep. 9, but does not indicate how one
determines when a presumption has been established and when
it has not. This distinction could well confuse lower
'

',;J.. ,,.

X
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courts as they try to decide which method of proof is applicable to the case bef.or.e them.
I agree that a plaintiff shou11 show more than a
"weak inference of discrimination" to establish a prima
facie case. But, it is not clear to me that Bill's and my
opini.ons oiffer signi.ficantly on this point. 'Neither of us
distinguishes between weak and strong inferences. Each refers only to establishing an "infer~nce of discrimination,"
and each entrusts this determination to the trier of fact.
It may be true, as you observe, that Bill's opinion would
leave more room for judges to dlsmiss a plaintiff's case.
But it provides no framework for determining whether the
employer has acted for discriminatory re~,:;ons. In this respect, it leaves the trier of fact free to find a prima
facie case when there has been proof of only a weak inference of discrimination. I suppose it also would leave a
court free to ~e;ect proof as strong as that mane out by
Aikens.

My opi.nion does qive triera of fact some latitude
in judging the strength of the inference of discrimination
to be drawn from the evldence. At the same time, i.t notes
that the McDonnell Douglas factors continue to provide a
rough guide for making this determination. ~s the McDonnell
Douglas framework provides the trial court with both flexibility and guidance in assessing the strength of a plaintiff'~ evidence, I see no reason for us to depart from it by
distinguishing between inference~ and presumptions of
discrimination.

I certainly am not unmindful of the desirability
of having a Court. Yet, I a.m unwilling to ioin an opinion
that seems to me to cast doubt as to what the Court has said
and intendea in our prior decisions.
I have no objection, of course, to your showing
this letter to Bill. He and I have had quite an exchange on
this case already.
Sincerely,

Justice Sttavens
lfp/ss
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March 2, 1983
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No. 81-1044

United States Postal Service v. Louis H Aikens

[March

_ _,

1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

u.s.c.

§ 2000e et seq.,

claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service,
discriminated against him on account of his race.

Aikens, who is

black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily
refused to promote him to higher positions in the Washington,
D.C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937.

After a

bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the
Postal Service, but this judgment was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.

642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980).

We vacated the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981).

453 U.S. 902 (1981).

On remand, the Court of Appeals

;
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reaffirmed its earlier holding that the District Court had erred
in requiring Aikens to offer direct proof of discriminatory
intent.

665 F. 2d 1057, 1058 (CADC 1981)

(per curiam).

We

granted certiorari to consider the assessment of pioof of racial
discrimination when an employer has selected among applicants for
a higher managerial position. 1

The Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, held not only
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to offer direct
proof of discriminatory intent, 2 but also that it erred in
requiring Aikens to show, as part of his prima facie case, that
he was "as qualified or more qualified" than the people who were
promoted.

The Postal Service insists that an employee who has

shown only that he was black, that he had applied for a promotion
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that the
Postal Service selected a non-minority applicant has not
established a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination

lwe have consistently distinguished disparate treatment
cases from cases involving facially neutral employment standards
that have disparate impact on minority applicants. See, e.g.,
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US .• 248,
252, n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802, n. 14 (1973).
2 As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by
direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should
consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence
it deserves. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
District Court should not have required Aikens to submit direct
evidence of discriminatory intent. See Teamsterse v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44 (1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas
formula does not require direct proof of discrimination.")

No. 81-1044
-
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under Title VII.

Since the case has been fully tried on the merits in the
District Court, one might at first blush wonder why the parties
are still arguing about the nature of a prima facie case.
Indeed, to the untutored this case, tried to the District Court
in January, 1979, might seem to be one that could have been
disposed of in a relatively short span of time

(according to

judicial lights) with the District Court making the necessasry
essential findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court
of Appeals reviewing those findings and conclusions under the
appropriate standards. 3

But we take the case as it comes to us.

We think that some statements in the briefs of the parties
and of the amici, urging us either to "adhere" to, modify, or
reconsider, the line of cases beginning with McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972), reveal an imprecise
,

understanding of that line of cases.

Because this approach may

have been shared in part by the District Court and by the Court
of Appeals in the present case, we take the liberty of setting
forth the facts as well as the law in the principal cases in the
McDonnell Douglas line.

In McDonnell Douglas itself, the defendant employer ran a

3 see Pullman Standard v. Swint,

U.S.

__, .

(1982).
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newspaper advertisement seeking qualified mechanics.

The

plaintiff, a qualified mechanic who had been laid off by the
defendant, applied for reemployment.

The defendant declined to

rehire him, even though it continued to hire other applicants who
responded to the advertisement after the plaintiff.

The

plaintiff's Title VII suit was dismissed by the District Court,
but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.

That

court held that the reason given by the defendant for refusing to
rehire plaintiff--plaintiff's participation in a "stall in" and
"lock-in" at defendant's place of business--was a "subjective"
criterion that carried little weight in rebutting charges of
discrimination.

The Court of Appeals set forth its version of a

prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.

Our opinion described the now familiar elements of a prima
facie case:
;

"The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be
done by showing {i} that he belongs to a racial
minority; {ii} that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
{iii} that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and {iv} that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications."
Id., at 802.

We immediately added, however, that "[t]he facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of the
prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily

No. 81-1044
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applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."
Id., at 802, n. 13.

We returned to the same question in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).

The employer's business

was the rehabilitation of steel mill blast furnaces with "fire
brick."

The employer did not maintain a permanent force of

bricklayers; instead, it hired a superintendent for each project,
and then delegated to him the task of securing a competent work
force.

The superintendent who declined to hire the plaintiff

/

dignot accept applications at the job site, but hired only
persons he knew to be experienced and competent in this work or
who had been recommended to him as similarly skilled.

The

employer claimed this policy was established to ensure that only
experienced and highly qualified fire bricklayers were employed,
because untimely work could result in substantial losses both to
the steel mill operator and to the contractor-employer.

Id., at

569-572.

We agreed with the Court of Appeals that the black
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case.

We disagreed,

however, with its conclusion that the reasons for the employer's
hiring practices were illegitimate.

In discussing the showing

required of the parties to Title VII suits, we pointed out:

"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such
as this is always whether the employer is treating
'some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'

No. 81-1044
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Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsteres v. United States,
supra, [431 U.S.,] at 335, n. 15. The method suggested
in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry,
however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of
discrimination." 438 U.S., at 577.

Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), plaintiff, a woman, claimed that
the employer's failure to promote her and its later decision to
terminate her had both resulted from gender-based discrimination.
The District Court found after a bench trial that neither
decision was discriminatory.

Id., at 251.

The Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court
as to the promotion, but reversed its finding on the termination.

We reviewed only the part of the case that had been reversed
by the Court of Appeals, 4 and stated more clearly the
consequences of the plaintiff's success in making the showing ~;
required by McDonnell Douglas.

"Establishment of the prima facie case in effect
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee. If the trier of
fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the
employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no
issue of fact remains in the case." Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(emphasis supplied).
4 Thus Burdine's failure to be promoted to a managerial
position was not before us.

No. 81-1044
- 7 The justification for a - f - ~ r i n g that judgment be
entered for the plaintiff in these circumstances can be found in
Furnco.

"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises
an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors .... And we are willing to presume this largely
because we know that from our experience that more
often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons
for rejecting an applicant had been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more
likely than not the employer, whom we generally assume
acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race." 438 U.S.,
at 577.
More succinctly phrased, a prima facie case "eliminates the most
common non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."
Burdine, supra, at 254.

For this reason, we have held that an

unrebutted prima facie case is sufficiently compelling to require
a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.

In the present case, both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals apparently thought that Aikens' claim against the
Postal Service fits into the pattern of the McDonnell Douglas
line of cases.

We disagree.

The first and third elements of

McDonnell Douglas are undoubtedly present; Aikens belongs to a
racial minority, and he applied for the promotions in question
but was denied them.

The fourth element, however, is entirely

absent; the position did not remain open, as it did in McDonnell
Douglas, but was filled by the applicant chosen in preference to

No. 81-1044
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Indeed, where an employer seeks to fill a single

managerial position, the position will by definition not be open
after one of the applicants has been chosen.

The second McDonnell Douglas element--the showing that the
plaintiff was "qualified" for the job--is more problematic.
There is no doubt that Aikens had an impressive resume.

He has a

Masters Degree and has completed three years of residence towards
a Ph.D.

He has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose

management abilities are far above average."

App. 8.

There was ·

no derogatory or negative information in his Personnel Folder.
He had more supervisory seniority and training and development
courses than all but one of the white persons who were promoted
above him.

It is clear that his qualifications were sufficient,

in the eyes of the Postal Service, to merit serious
consideration.

At this point, however, agreement between the parties, and
between the courts that have considered this factual issue,
breaks down.

It is argued that Aikens must show he is "as

qualified" as the person actually chosen, "better qualified" than
the person actually chosen, "relatively qualified," or merely
"qualified" for the jobs he sought.

We believe that this COF'}·test '<--

of comparatives ttltimately t3roves -self-sttl-ltifying.

The fair reading of the McDonnell Douglas advertisement for
qualified mechanics is that there was a known, reasonably

No. 81-1044
-

9 -

objective basis for determining who was a qualified mechanic, and
that applicants would be hired on a first come, first served
basis until the employer had obtained the number of mechanics it
needed.

But where one managerial position is open, there may be

no totally objective measure of who is "qualified," and the
employer certainly does not undertake to promote more than one
applicant.

Employers consider a wide range of factors, such as

each applicant's understanding of the organization's goals,
ability to work effectively with particular supervisors and
subordinates, maturity, originality, initiative, and decision
making ability.

It will rarely, if ever, be possible to quantify

all the relevant criteria and tally them on a scorecard. 5

In these circumstances, the question is not whether we will
"follow" the McDonnell-Douglas line of cases, but how much
guidance those cases provide for the trier of fact in a
dissimilar factual situation such as this one.

McDonnell Douglas

and Furnco both dealt with entry level jobs, one in a large
manufacturing industry and the other in the construction
industry.

In those cases we made it clear that if the plaintiff

5 But the procedural significance of the prima facie case
gives us some guidance concerning the showing that a plaintiff
must make to establish that he was "qualified," in order to shift
the burden of production to the employer. An employer filling a
managerial or professional position may have legitimate,
subjective business reasons, known only to the employer, for
preferring one applicant over another. Where this is the case,
these reasons should form part of the employer's burden of
production in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case,
rather than part of the plaintiff's prima facie case itself.

No. 81-1044
- 10 can meet the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case- -that he belonged to a racial minority, that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants, that he was rejected, and that after his rejection
the employer continued to seek similarly qualified applicants--

l

the plaintiff has in effect negatived the most common
explanations that would rebut his allegations of discriminatory
animus.

But that simply is not true in the present case.

The

"qualifications" for the position as laid down by the Postal
Service, while not appearing as clearly from the record as might
be, were by no means as easy to assess as the qualifications for
a "mechanic" advertised for in McDonnell Douglas.

In addition,

there were several applicants for each position, and only one
could be chosen.

Hence, as we have noted, the position did not

remain open after Aikens was rejected.

Under these
;

circwnstances, · we do not think that, simply by showing that he is
black, that he was sufficiently qualified to be seriously
considered, and that the Postal Service did not give him the job
but promoted one of several non-minority applicants, Aikens
nondisc~

"the m~

,
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reasons" for his
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just'/ 1{ pn,.s u m p t i o ~ discriminated a
~ ayntif-f-. ·~

J,d

-+-

Even though a plain-t:iff lik ~ Aikens may be unable
standardized prima facie case by proving the existenee of the ~
__.---four factors described in MeDom:1eJ J Doug] as, we have rep~at ~ :

~

~ do c.""S ,vor /JA/2. ff1A-J ~ . . , l ! A ~
emphasized that t ~ e cue othe:r ways fG-E-a p l a i ~ 9 v a i l s,_
d qp ; "" ~J&p tas£ WP '('./-1,J A.A- ....,...., d,,i_, C,../1..-t.-- ._;._()A..fz_~d t,.. 0~ f ( x . . ~ -R /.. ,. .
irr a! itl~
ca.~ Q~ See pp. 3-4, supra (quoting from McDonnell

VI~

Douglas and Furnco); see also Burdine, supra, at 253, n. 6;
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).

In an

appropriate case, the four McDonnell Douglas factors serve to
focus the court's attention on a limited number of probative
facts, but these are not the only items of evidence that may tend
to show that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.
Other types of circumstantial or direct evidence may be
available.

A plaintiff might introduce anecdotal or statistical

evidence of discriminatory attitudes and practices by the
;

employer.

Or he might show that the employer engaged in

irregular business practices such as promoting subordinates over
him.

More infrequently, a plaintiff may be able to present

direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent in his

No. 81-1044
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I

I

I

own case.

Although such evidence as this does not coincide with

the standardized four-factor prima facie case described in the
McDonnell Douglas case, we emphasize that, if supported by
credible proof, it may establish a nonstandardized prima facie
case. 7

In other words, if a plaintiff presents a sHffieien
.

strong case

\._~ ~d!

......,.-c... " " ' ~ ~ _ _ . _ /

ev1dence'"\t-hat showd that 1t was more likely than not

that the employer discriminated against him

-

......

·-

,,._,-

-

··

Hnder the normal .._

·1111;..

--

-

,-

-

~

-

7 of course, two of the McDonnell Douglas factors are
absolute prerequisites to recovery in any Title VII hiring or
promotion case- -that the plaintiff is a member of a protected
category of persons, and that he or she was not chosen for the
job in question. Another McDonnell Douglas factor, that the
plaintiff was qualified for the job, raises more complexities
when the selection process involves subjective qualifications,
see p. _ _ , supra, but it is evident that a rejected applicant
who is clearly unfit for the job cannot prevail in a Title VII
suit. Thus a plaintiff cannot establish a l.>-F~'HTl'fl-B~·-e.J~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~f"<... ation and shift th-e---httt:-den of prodtret-ion to trre-emp-3:ey..
without proving that he or she possessed objective qualifications
fairly comparable to other applicants that merited the employer's
serious consideration. Thus, in attempting to make out a
nonstandardized prima facie case, the plaintiff is required to .,
adduce proof that closely resembles three of the McDonnell
Douglas factors.
In a significant sense, therefore, it is a matter of semantics
whether the nonstandardized prima facie case is, on the one hand,
described in terms of four factors, the fourth of which is so
flexible that it can accommodate any type of probative evidence~
or, on the other hand, characterized as a flexible concept that
varies with the evidence presented. What is important to bear in
mind is that a prima facie case is made out if, but only if, the
plaintiff's evidence standing unrebutted
· ......m
.........o~r~e;;._~----~
likely than not that the defendant acte in a discriminatory
manner. As this definition makes clear, a prima facie case can
be made out even if plaintiff has not egated all conceivable
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's action.
But if the plaintiff has not elimi ated the most common such
reasons, then the trier of fact ould be unable to infer that it
is more likely than not that
e plaintiff was the victim of
discrimination. ·
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In the absence of rebuttal by

~ /JfJ /'1VS'f" ~k-ra
the def end ant, &t1-Sl::l a p ~s umpt ion r e qYi r es.. judgment for the

plaintiff as a matter of law because he has met his burden of
showing discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Thus,

as with the standardized prima facie case, the effect of the
pre s umption is to shift the burden of production to the employer
to avert the entry of judgment against him.

See Burdine, supra,

at 255, n. 8.

We recognize that in a case in which the evidence does not
fit neatly into the standardized McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case, the tasks facing both the plaintiff and the trier of fact
are more difficult.

For in a standardized case like McDonnell

Douglas or Furnco, four relatively straightforward inquiries will
determine whether a prima facie case has been established; this
is simply not true in cases like the present one.

But the

plaintiff, through use of the liberal discovery provided in Fed .,•
R. Civ. P. 26-37, can depose a defendant's employees and obtain
relevant documents relating to employment decisions.

The court

is called upon to exercise a greater degree of judgment when it
decides, in a nonstandardized case presenting a variety of types
f}..._....p!~--4')./ ~ ~ ~ A . . J ~
of evidence , whether i:-t-:i:-s-mo r e i lk-e-1:-y- Lh a II no t--eh-a-t:-t.w.-cc.---.:_
~/!..~ •

.plain t iff was d i s er: imiR-a-t-e.d-ag..a..i - ~ But it should not be
forgotten that a Title VII lawsuit is a civil action, not unlike
other civil actions, and that triers of fact are customarily
given the difficult task of weighing and balancing the evidence

to determine wile shoul d p , ev L

:,/

11-~f<j( j,,.,, ~

k

~ct_.
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The trier of fact may be called upon to evaluate the
strength of the plaintiff's case at two points in the trial.
First, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant may
make a Rule 4l(b) motion to dismiss.

If the plaintiff has

established a standardized prima facie case by establishing
precisely the four factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas, then
the Rule 4l(b) motion must be denied.

Similarly, if the

plaintiff has established a nonstandardized prima facie case--by

.t.

~~
presenting evidence s: ; : ; ~
to i;h ~ w, in the absence of
J.Qc,wz 4.- -h....:-.. .f} 6'-<f +o ~ - < rebuttal, that plaintift was more likely than not the victim of

;;;11gb

I\

unlawful discrimination--the Rule 4l(b) motion must be denied.
Indeed, if judgment for the defendant were granted, that decision
would be reversible error, because the plaintiff has established
a right to a rebuttable presumption in his or her favor.

stanaa~gized or nonstandardized, then the court has
trial g

exercise of aiscretion.

;

forward with the pre eQtation

evidence, for

-..........

Rule 4l(b) clearly states
any judgment until the
decide the

"may decline to render
he evidence."

Or it may

e merits and render judgment
...._ against the

plaintiff, if 1t determines as a matter of law that:"th_e evidenc
producec(by the plaintiff, even if unrebutted,
v---~"-di.sc.riminat-ion-b-y a - preponderance of th-e evidenee.- - - - -

Second, after both plaintiff and defendant have presented
their evidence, the court must decide whether the plaintiff has

I

No. 81-1044
- 15 proven discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

At

.so_

_.--this stage,,, the three-step analytical framework set forth in
~
. J..e.;,, °'- ~
1-:_f-- c.,;._
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine ~
des a men t al r'6-a-amap for

'!?

.....-c> ..,..--

-

evaluating all of the evidence in light of common experience and
common sense.

~

It tells tt..h e trie r-of Ea o t l first to look at the

plaintiff's case and assess its strength, then to examine the
~~ h>
f"k_~f<l{h......,pi~
defendant's justifications and decide whether D
•
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pretextual. 8
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If they a r:-e- f)-F-e-~ t lt t-1,

A

th e-p±-a-i-A-t-i-f-Lµrev.ail.s-,
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. a L I. on na-s
i
--(.,,..--a-i-se3-!"-i.1TI 111

supra, at 255-256.

~L been effe~t~v~~y r ebu tt-ed...

----Q_,,

~

See Burdine,

To the extent that this is the teaching of

McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, it is of course applicable to
every Title VII case, whether or not the plaintiff's proof fits

8 In Burdine, supra, we reaffirmed the basic allocation of
burdens and order of proof initially set forth in McDonnell
Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant '.to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'
[McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.], at 802. Third, should
the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have the opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination."
450 U.S., at 252-253.

;

This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact
"expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be proved-whether the challenged employment decision was in fact
discriminatory. See id., at 253.
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Applying these considerations to the case at hand, we
conclude, first, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
a presumption of discrimination is justified any time a white
applicant is promoted to a job for which a qualified black man
applied.

642 F. 2d, at 517; 665 F. 2d, at 1058-1059.

It did

not, however, analyze the record in light of the considerations
we have just set forth.

We are therefore not fully apprised of

all of the evidence relevant to the question whether Aikens was
the victim of discrimination.

Nor is it the task of a reviewing

court to sift the evidence in the first instance.

The District

Court, which is able to perceive the attitude and demeanor of
witnesses, and to evaluate their credibility and the weight that
should be placed on their testimony, is in a far better position
than either this Court or the Court of Appeals to decide in the
first instance whether the Postal Service discriminated against
;

Aikens.

Court, on remand, would be able to find sufficient
evidence in the record to establish a nonstandardized prima faci
case.

The record might show that, had there been no rebuttal,

Aikens would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
and that a decision to the contrary would have been reversible
error.

But that is not necessary to permit Aikens to prevail.

---t!Al-4:::.U--.l...L-.~·~,e-R-S-'- C-a~
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fa Cl e-c-ase--(J-i,...¥-1-'-ttt1,

No. 81-1044
- 17 ].egally_:manda /

tha

it. j /

- -- presumpt- ·n ju~t des ~

ies at 1

bed, it

st a permissible inferen/ eof

T)Y' would be, / ough to w~
. .ppe-r t , t h-G Y-gh-R-e-E--1=-e-eemmand ,

~~n

~---- ·-··-

nd a R.:,,

41(b)

1~e.fl..t,---,1:,+1-- - -

the facts presented to us in the two opinions

the Court of Appeals, if the District Court were to conclude
Service treated Aikens less favorably than others
under the Rule 52(a) standard of appellate
review that judgment would surely_:__e up~~

~

::::- that white persons, who had been his

subordinates, were consistently promoted and detailed over him
between 1966 and 1974.

He had substantially more education than

the white employees who were advanced ahead of him: of the 12,
only two had any education beyond high school and none had a
college degree.

Aikens introduced testimony at trial that the

person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made
,

numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens
in particular.

He also introduced statistical evidence tending

,.
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- 18 All courts have recognized that the questions facing triers
of fact in discrimination cases are both sensitive and difficult.
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rightrs Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy.

In any

Title VII case, whether or not a standardized prima facie case is
available to the plaintiff, the ultimate question is "whether the
employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Furnco, supra, at 577 (quoting Teamsters, supra, at 335, n. 15).
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's

~ o n ef d4-scrimimrtro-rt-d:· ffer:ent-J:l.] f:rGm

i..k

~~e

t.b~

.--J:>-.

law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a

person's state of mind.

As Lord Justice Bowen said in treating

this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century
ago:
;

"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as
the state of his digestion.
It is true that it is very
difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a
particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is
as much as fact as anything else." Eddington v.
Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case
is remanded with directions to remand to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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I

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. The reasoning
of the plurality opinion appears to depart from the consistent
approach to Title VII cases that our precedents have developed. As I read the opinion, it perceives a distinction be- I
tween evidence that establishes a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973),
and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination.
See ante, at 9-11. If a plaintiff is able to make out a prima
facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination"
that shifts the burden of production in accordance with the
analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas.
See ante, at 10. If, however, a plaintiff proves only an
ference of discrimination," the plurality apparently would
find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. 1 See
id., at 10. In my view, this distinction finds no support in
our precedents. Instead, our cases make clear that evidence

I

"in- 1

The plurality opinion indicates that the evidence in this case may have
been sufficient to establish both an inference and a presumption of discrimination. See ante, at 9. But the opinion does not explain how or why
it distinguishes between these two levels of proof. In creating this distinction, the plurality departs from our precedents and-in my view-interj ects a confusing and unexplained distinction into Title VII law.
1
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I

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. The reasoning
of the plurality opinion appears to depart from the consistent
approach to Title VII cases that our precedents have developed. As I read the opinion, it perceives a distinction be- 1
tween evidence that establishes a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U. S. 792 (1973),
and evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination.
See ante, at 9-11. If a plaintiff is able to make out a prima
facie case, he is entitled to a "presumption of discrimination"
that shifts the burden of production in accordance with the
analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas.
See ante, at 10. If, however, a plaintiff proves only an
ference of discrimination," the plurality apparently would
find the McDonnell Douglas framework inapplicable. 1 See
id., at 10. In my view, this distinction finds no support in
our precedents. Instead, our cases make clear that evidence

I

"in- 1

The plurality opinion indicates that the evidence in this case may have
been sufficient to establish both an inference and a presumption of discrimination. See ante, at 9. But the opinion does not explain how or why
it distinguishes between these two levels of proof. In creating this distinction, the plurality departs from our precedents and-in my view-interjects a confusing and unexplained distinction into Title VII law.
1
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that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. They do not indicate, as the
plurality suggests, that the McDonnell Douglas framework
may be inapplicable to the type of employment decision pre- I
sented here.
I
In Texas Deparlment of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U. S. 248 (1981), we reaffirmed unanimously the basic
allocation of burdens and order of proof initially set forth in
McDonnell Douglas:
"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411
U. S.], at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450
U. S., at 252-253.
This framework is designed to bring the trier of fact "expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question to be provedwhether the challenged employment decision was in fact discriminatory. See id., at 253.
The prima facie case, the initial step in this process, requires a Title VII plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimination by removing the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for his rejection. See id., at 253-254. In many cases, a
plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden by proving only the
four factors noted in McDonnell Douglas. See 411 U. S., at
802. But we have never held that proof of these factors
automatically establishes a prima facie case. The facts in
each case will vary, and the prima facie proof specified in

81-1044-CONCUR
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOYS. v. AIKENS

3

McDonnell Douglas is not "necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations." Id., at 802, n. 13; see
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978). As we stated in Teamsters v. United States, 431
u. s. 324 (1977):
"The importance [of the McDonnell Douglas articulation
of the prima facie case] lies, not in its specification of the
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act." Id., at 358.
Thus, a court must question whether, in light of the particular employment decision involved, the plaintiff's proof raises
an inference of discrimination. 2 When a plaintiff has met
this initial burden, he "in effect creates a presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]." Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. This presumption is primarily an
evidentiary device for allocating intermediate burdens of
proof. It shifts the burden of production to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 3 See id., at 255 and n. 8.
JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion reasons that "[w]hen an employer is unable to articulate any legitimate reason for hiring a white applicant over a qualified Negro applicant, it is reasonable to infer that [the]
decision was based ... on impermissible considerations." Post, at 8.
This view, for the first time, would shift the burden of production to the
defendant even though the plaintiff has not met his initial burden. Our
prior decisions have stressed that the plaintiff initially must establish an
inference of discrimination. Only then does the burden shift to the employer to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 254 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 358, and n. 44 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792, 802 (1973).
3
The plurality seeks to justify its distinction between an inference of dis- 1
2
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As our cases make clear, we have never created a distinction between evidence that establishes an inference of discrimination and evidence that gives rise to a presumption of
discrimination. Rather the two concepts are interrelated.
Evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden
of production to the employer. See id., at 254; Furnco,
supra, at 577; Teamsters, supra, at 358. This analytical
framework has been applied consistently both by this Court
and the lower courts. Departing from it could create uncertainty and invite litigation.

II
In this case, the District Court found that respondent had
not established a prima facie case since he had failed to prove
the second of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. 4 He had
crimination and a presumption of discrimination by relying on footnote 7 in
Burdine, supra. See ante, at 11. In my view, the plurality reads too
much into this footnote. As we noted in Burdine, the term "prima facie
case" has been used in two ways. See 450 U. S., at 254, n. 7. It may
refer either to the level of proof necessary to withstand a motion for a directed verdict or to an evidentiary device that shifts the burden of production to the defendant. Footnote 7 stands only for the proposition-a proposition evident from the analytical framework established in McDonnell
Douglas-that proof of a prima facie case does more than allow a plaintiff to
withstand a motion for a directed verdict. It shifts the burden of production. As we subsequently explained, "'[t]he word "presumption" properly
used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden."' See
Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 8. (quoting F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, p. 255 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted)).
• In McDonnell Douglas, we stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case by showing:
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S., at 802.
We noted, however, that this model would vary according to the facts and

I
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not shown that he was "as qualified or more qualified" than
the individuals who were promoted. See Aikens v. Bolger,
Civ. Action No. 77-0303 (DDC Feb. 26, 1979). The Court of
Appeals reversed because the District Court had set too high
a standard. See 665 F. 2d 1057, 1060 (CADC 1982) (per
curiam). Although it recognized that "Title VII cases involving professional and managerial positions raise uniquely
difficult issues not found in cases involving lower-level jobs,"
it held that a plaintiff could prove the second McDonnell
Douglas factor by showing that he "possesses whatever
qualifications or background experiences the employer has
indicated are important." Ibid. Since the court viewed the
other three McDonnell Douglas factors as having been established, 5 it remanded for further consideration of respondent's
qualifications in light of its articulation of the applicable
standard.
In my view, the proof required by the Court of Appeals is
insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination where a
single executive position is to be filled from a pool of qualified
applicants. When an employer selects an applicant for a
managerial or professional position, the situation is quite different from the employment decision made in cases such as
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Whether an applicant
possesses minimum objective qualifications is merely the
threshold inquiry since the applicants who meet the minimum
requirements normally will present an employer with a wide
range of qualifications and credentials. A responsible employer of course will wish to fill the position with the best
circumstances of each case. See id., at 802, n. 13.
6
The Court of Appeals initially had found that respondent had proved
each of the four McDonnell Douglas factors. See Aikens v. United States
Postal Service, 642 F. 2d 514, 517-518 (CADC 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand from this Court, the Court of
Appeals apparently adhered to its earlier determination that the other
three factors had been proved, as it remanded to the District Court only
for reconsideration of the second factor.

;
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qualified applicant. Yet making a fair ·and intelligent judgment may require a weighing of qualities not always apparent from information of record. For example, consideration
normally would be given to an applicant's leadership qualities
and ability to work well with others. Depending upon the
level and authority of the position, the capacity of the applicant to make sound decisions could be critical.
Additionally, when there are several qualified applicants
who can be viewed as satisfying all of the foregoing factors,
the employer necessarily must prefer one applicant over others. A choice has to be made, and thus an employer's decision to select a qualified non-minority person from a pool of
applicants does not necessarily imply that the choice was discriminatory. See Teamsters, supra, at 358 n. 44. In this
respect, this case differs significantly from McDonnell Douglas, where the employer rejected a qualified minority applicant but left the position unfilled and continued to seek other
applicants. See 411 U. S., at 802. Because the employer's
decision was facially inconsistent with its own economic self
interest, the plaintiff in that case "was rejected under circumstances which [gave] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, supra, at 253. No similar inference
can be drawn in this case where the job was not left open.
The employment decision at issue here illustrates what our
cases consistently have recognized: the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case will vary from the model set forth in
McDonnell Douglas depending on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. See Burdine, supra, at 253, n.
6; McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13. This does not
mean, however, as the Court seems to believe, that the
McDonnell Douglas factors are no longer relevant in determining whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimination. They continue to provide a rough guide to the
type of evidence that a plaintiff must introduce.
Thus, if a plaintiff's "absolute or relative lack of qualifications" prevents him from being seriously considered for a po-
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sition, see Teamsters, supra, at 358, n. 44, there would be
little reason to infer that the employer rejected him for discriminatory reasons. As noted above, to be seriously considered for a managerial or professional position, a plaintiff at
least must possess objective qualifications that are fairly
comparable to those of the other applicants. Proof of these
qualifications normally will be a predicate to establishing a
prima facie case. We have emphasized, however, that
establishing such a case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that he "was rejected under circumstances which give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination." See Burdine,
supra, at 253. This often will require a plaintiff to introduce
additional evidence. 6 If, for example, the position remains
unfilled, as in McDonnell Douglas, this could be viewed as a
departure from conduct ordinarily expected of an employer,
giving rise to such an inference.

III
The McDonnell Douglas factors provide a guide to determining whether a plaintiff has proved a prima facie case; they
were never intended to establish an inflexible rule. Each
case must be assessed in light of its own particular facts to
determine if a plaintiff has introduced evidence that raises an
inference of discrimination. In this case, respondent produced abundant evidence to show objectively that he was at
least as qualified as the individuals who were given the positions. He also proved that the Postal Service had passed
over him repeatedly and chosen white applicants who had
held positions subordinate to his own-an apparent depar6
As indicated above, an employer-in filling a managerial or professional position-often will have legitimate, subjective business reasons for
preferring one applicant over another. See supra, at ~- Where these
reasons are known only to the employer, as frequently will be the case,
they must be brought out by the employer after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.

'

;
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ture from the normal course of business. In addition, respondent introduced anecdotal and statfstical evidence of racial discrimination. It appears to be clear that an inference
of discrimination arises from this evidence, establishing a
prima facie case. But resolution of this factual question is
more appropriately left to the courts below. Accordingly, I
agree that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be vacated
and the case remanded for further consideration.

~u:punu (!Jltu.d llf t4.t 'Jttuittb ~bd.tll
~aglfhtghttt. ~. <!J. 2llpJt.~
CHAMBERS OP

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 2, 1983

Re:

81-1044 - U.S. Postal Svs. v. Aikens

Dear Lewis, Bill, & Sandra:
The more I have studied what has been written in
this case the more firmly I have become convinced that
an opinion to which we could all subscribe should be
draftable. I have therefore thought it worthwhile to
try to redraft the portions of Bill's opinion that
Lewis finds most difficult to accept but yet to retain
the central analysis with which I agree. I am
enclosing the results of that attempt to see if you
think there is any possibility that it might at least
provide the basis for a draft that we could all accept.
(Lewis and Sandra wTil both ' recognize a good deal of
plagiarism in the paragraphs that are new).
The reasons why we should make every effort to
obtain a Court opinion in this case are too obvious to
restate. I would only add that if I have been
unfaithful either to Bill's analysis or to Lewis'
concerns, the error is purely unintentional.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

Enclosure

;

.

drk 03/02/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

.From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens

Justice Stevens' draft in Aikens is an improvement over
Justice Rehnquist's draft.

Yet, it is not without its problems.

Under his draft, a plaintiff has three alternatives ~
"standardized prima facie" case.

e may prove a

This case would be applicable in

employment situations similar to those in McDonnell Douglas and
would be established on pr~
McDonnell Douglas.
facie case."

Secon~

/

of the four factors specified in
may prove a "nonstandardized prima

This case is applicable when the employment situation

or the factual situation departs from that in McDonnell Douglas.

A

plaintiff may establish a nonstandardized case by adducing evidence
;

along the lines of yours and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions
in Aikens.

See pp. 11-13 & n. 7.

Justice Stevens states that a

plaintiff must "presen[t] a sufficiently strong case--evidence that
shows that it was more likely than not that the employer
discriminated against him."

p. 12.

If a plaintiff establishes

either a standardized or a nonstandardized prima facie case, ~
entitled to a legally mandatory rebuttable presumption.

s

Third, if a

plaintiff fails to prove either a standardized or a nonstandardized
case:

(

2.

·.

"then the court has room for the exercise of discretion.
The court may choose to let the trial go forward with the
presentation of the defendant's evidence, for Rule 4l(b)
clearly states that the court "may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence." Or it may
decide the case on the merits and render judgment against
the plaintiff, if it determines as a matter of law that
the evidence produced by the plaintiff, even if
unrebutted, is insufficient to show discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence." p. 14.
Justice Stevens would retain the three-step analytical framework set
forth in McDonnell Douglas as a "mental road map" for evaluating all
of the evidence in a case.

Its function is to "tel[l] the trier of

fact first to look at the plaintiff's case and assess its strength,
then to examine the defendant's justifications and decide whether
they are genuine or pretextual."

p. 15

My difficulty with Justice Stevens' draft is that it
retains, without saying it, the inference/presumption distinction
that was

-----present in Justice

Rehnquist's drafts.

Justice Stevens'

draft recognizes that there will be strong inferences of
discrimination that will be sufficient to establish a
nonstandardized prima facie case.

It also recognizes that the

plaintiff's evidence, as a matter of law, may not be sufficient t~ ;
show discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

This leaves

a middle category where the trial court, in its discretion, may
allow the case to go ahead.

This middle category seems to be what

Justice Rehnquist had termed an "inference of discrimination" and
what Justice Stevens had termed in his letter to you a "weak
inference of discrimination."
There are several problems with introducing this "middle
category" into Title VII analysis.

Since proof of the middle

category does not shift the burden of production, it renders any

?

3.
procedural effect of the McDonnell Douglas framework relatively
meaningless.

The allocation of burdens and order of proof in

McDonnell Douglas no longer provide a procedural mechanism for
focusing the substantive inquiry as to whether the challenged
employment decision was in fact discriminatory.

As restated in

Justice Stevens' draft, the McDonnell Douglas framework provides
only a "mental roadmap."

Indeed, if a plaintiff has introduced only

encough evidence to satisfy this middle category, it does not make
any sense to speak of shifting the burden of production to the
employer.
Curiously enough, the opinion appears almost to create a
two stage analysis in which the burden of persuasion is shifted to
the employer.

Justice Stevens characterizes the trial court's task

as assessing the strength of the plaintiff's case and assessing the
credibility of the employer's case.

His opinion then states, "[i)f

the [employer's justifications] are pretextual, the plaintiff
prevails, because in essence the plaintiff's evidence tending to
show discrimination has not been effectively rebutted."

p. 15.

This formulation implies that the employer bears the burden of
proving that its reasons were not pretextual.

Thus, even when the

plaintiff has not introduced enough evidence to establish a
nonstandardized prima facie case, the employer may find itself
saddled with a greater burden than if the plaintiff had adduced
evidence giving rise to a stronger inference of discrimination.
The problem with the opinion does not lie just in matters
of phrasing.

Instead, it seems that the introduction of a middle

category, in which the plaintiff does not make out a prima facie

(

4.

_____

~-----------------

case but still survives a 4l(b} moition, renders the whole McDonnell

,

.....

--

Douglas scheme superfluous.

,----- -----

As discussed in my earlier memo, to the

extent that will be easier for DC's to rely on this lesser standard
of proof, there is a substantial possiblity that the McDonnell
Douglas framework will not be used.

Further, the opinion does not

explain why this middle category is necessary or how it advances the
analysis.

While the opinion is done with a deft touch, I am not

sure that it is consistent with the analysis that was established in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1044, United States Postal Service v. Aikens

I have attached a marked up copy of Justice Stevens' draft
in Aikens.

There are two problems that I sought to remedy, both of

which are related.

The opinion, as written by Justice Stevens,

holds that even if a plaintiff does not establish a "standardized
prima facie case," he may seek to establish a "nonstandardized prima
facie case."

My primary difficulty with Justice Stevens'

articulation of the nonstandardized prima facie case is that it sets
too high a threshold for the nonstandardizea prima facie case.
Justice Stevens would find that a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case only when he "shows that it was more
likely than not that the employer discriminated against him."
12.

p.

~

!

This means, I believe, that a plaintiff may establish a prima

facie case under Justice Stevens' view only when he has proved
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence--i.e., shown that
it was more likely than not that the employer discriminated against
him.

As I understand the analysis in Burdine, this sets too high a

standard for proof of the prima facie case.

Under Burdine, a prima

facie case will be proved when a plaintiff has established an
inference of discrimination.

Evidence that establishes an inference

2.

of discrimination allows a trier of fact to presume that the
plaintiff has proved the presumed fact--discriminatory motive--by a
preponderance of the evidence, unless the employer rebuts this
presumption by meeting his burden of production.

Thus, if the

employer fails to articulate a legitimate business reason for his
actions, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail.

If the employer does

meet his burden the presumption drops from the case.

As you explain

in footnote 10 of Burdine, this does not destroy the probative value
of the evidence adduced at the prima facie stage.

It simply means

that we no longer will presume that it is more likely than not that
the employer acted for discriminatory reasons.

The plaintiff then

has an opportunity to prove that the employer's reasons were
pretextual.
Justice Stevens' higher standard is derived from Furnco.
seep. 10 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S., at 577).

But I do not believe

that Furnco mandates this level of proof as a prerequisite to
establishing a prima facie case.

The full quotation from which

Justice Stevens' standard is drawn provides:
;

"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors."
As I read Furnco, proof of a prima facie case allows a trier to fact
to presume that the it was more likely than not--i.e., to presume
that the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence-that the employer's action was based on impermissible factors.
Thus, Furnco states the effect of proving a prima facie case, not
the evidence necessary to establish one.

I do not believe that

Furnco or Burdine requires that a plaintiff prove discrimination by

3.

a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish a prima facie
case.
Because Justice Stevens may have read too much into
Furnco, he ends up setting a very high standard for a plaintiff to
establish a nonstandardized prima facie case.
problems.

This results in two

First, few plaintiffs will ever make out a prima facie

case, standardized or nonstandardized.

The standardized prima facie

case will be applicable only when a plaintiff falls within the fact
situation of McDonnell Douglas and the nonstandardized prima facie
case will be applicable only when a plaintiff can establish
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
This leads to a second problem.

Because both these

standards are relatively unavailable, there is a need for a lower
level of proof.

This level of proof exists whenever a plaintiff can

survive a motion for a directed verdict but cannot establish
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Although Justice

Stevens leaves this middle category nameless throughout much of the
opinion, he finally terms it a "permissible inference" on page 17.
The result of Justice Stevens' opinion, as Justice Rehnquist's

~

;

before him, is to establish a presumption/inference distinction that
is unwarranted by the prior opinions.

The creation of the

permissible inference distinction results, I believe, from his
misreading of Furnco and his setting the standard for a prima facie
case too high.
All this is a long explanation of the changes I made.
First, I tinkered with the statement of the "more likely than not"
test to bring it into accord with what I believe is the letter and

4.
spirit of Furnco.

Second, once the level of proof for the

nonstandardized prima facie case was lowered, there was no need to
retain the category of "permissible inferences."

Since the category

of permissible inferences emerges clearly only at the last of the
opinion in a couple of references, I excised those paragraphs.
I am not completely satisfied with the opinion as marked.
I believe the "more likely than not" language in Furnco confuses the
issue by stating the effect of the presumption, rather than what is
necessary to establish it.

I think your explanation is clearer,

fairer to both plaintiffs and defendants, and more consistent with
precedent.

Perhaps I am too close to the opinion to take a balanced

view, but I think Justice Stevens' opinion would limit substantially
the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

;

.inprtmt <lf4tltrt qf tlft ~tb ~tatt.e
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First let me say that I am most appreciative of your
willingness to act as a "mediator" between Lewis and me in
this case. I think Lewis and I had concluded after earlier
exchanges that we were like "east is east, and west is west,
and never the twain shall meet."
Respecting the revisions in my circulating draft which
are contained in the substitute which you enclose with your
letter of March 2nd, I can give you a general response. The
changes appearing on pages 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, and most of 11
are satisfactory to me, and I think in many instances
represent improvements on my most recent circulating draft.
Subject to the approval of the Chief and Byron, I would
accept them.
With respect to some of the changes on page 11, and the
changes on pages 12, 13, 14, 15, and parts of 16 and 17, I
don't doubt that they represent as good an attempt as can be
made to "harmonize" the approach I have taken and the
'
approach Lewis has taken. But I fear that the result of
accepting them would be to produce internal inconsistencies
in the opinion as a whole that would prove more confusing to
lower courts than if my present circulation came down as a
plurality opinion. Regrettable as that would be, it would
get it off of all our minds for a while, and give us a
chance to take another look at the question when it comes
back, as it inevitably will if this case is decided in that
manner.
At this late date, it occurs to me that it might have
been possible to write the opinion more narrowly than is
required to respond to the issues framed by the parties, and
simply point out the undesirability of dealing with
arguments about inferences and presumptions when the

-

2 -

District Court had conducted a full bench trial and made
findings of fact and conclusions of law. I fear, however,
that I may lack the necessary energy and dedication to go
back to the drawing boards at this stage of the case.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc:

Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor

j

' I
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 9, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1044

U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

Dear Lewis:
I enclose a copy of the "new" Aikens opinion. You
will find it at least slimmer, if not better, than before.
I have tried to pretermit any discussion about whether
the McDonnell Douglas presumption should have been applied
in this case, and simply dwelled on the fact that an
appeals court reviewing a judgment of the trial court
after a full trial should not get tangled up in questions
about presumptions.
If you think you could join this, I am hopeful that
the Chief, Byron, and John, and perhaps Sandra, might also
Join.
If you don't think it is "joinable," I think it
better to have the case come down in its present form,
and I will not bother to circulate my revision to the
Conference.

Sincere~

Justice Powell

..

The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated: _ _ __ __ _ __
Recirculated:--- -- - - -

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST

s

No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD
ERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AI 1
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO TH

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Co
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of t '-.....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service, discriminated against him on account of his race.
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902
(1981).
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens
to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as
part of his prima facie case, that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted
certiorari. 1 - - U. S. - - (1982).
1

We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate
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The Postal Service argues that an employee who has
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not established a "'J)'rima f acie" case of employment discrimination
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title
impact on minority applicants. See, e. g., Texas Deparlment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973).
2
Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974.
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would
be reversible error.
•As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44

;
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine,
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id., at 254.
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima f acie case,' and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10,
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325;
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case.
The "factual inquiry'' in a Title VII case is ''whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination.")
•1t appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that
Aikens had made out a primafacie case. When Aikens concluded his case
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion.
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a.
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... treating 'some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case,
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide
whether ''the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253.
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in
Burdine:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
450 U. S., at 256.
In short, the district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult.
5()f course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, surrra, at 256. There is
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity.
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy.
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal
rules which were devised to govern ''the allocation of burdens
and order of presentation of proof," id., at 252, in deciding
this ultimate question. The law often obliges finders of fact
to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord Justice
Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div.
459, 483 (1885).

The District Court erroneously thought that respondent
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question
of prima facie case rather than directly on the question of discrimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evidence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated
against Aikens.
It is so ordered.

;

- ------~-~~------------------~---------~--,-,

March 9, 1983

81-1044 U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens

Dear 'Bill:

l called your Chamhers this afternoon, just after
you had departed, to say that I will be happy to join your
"ne,,1" Aikens opinion.
It may not make the casebooks, and yet I think it
adequately disposes of this case. I note that you have included bits and pieces from several of our opinionq, anrl
this may help bring about a consensus.
I appreciatP your undertaking a Solomonic revision, and I t~ink you have done it very well.
Sincerely,

Justtc~ Rehnquist
lfp/ss

"',

.
To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated:

MAR I 3 1983

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et
seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal Service, discriminated against him on account of his race.
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902
(1981).
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens
to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as
part of his prima facie case, that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted
certiorari. 1 - - U. S. - - (1982).
1
We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate

,,
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The Postal Service argues that an employee who has
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not established a "prima f acie" case of employment discrimination
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973).
2
Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974.
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would
be reversible error.
3
As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44

;
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine,
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id., at 254.
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case, 4 and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10,
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325;
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case.
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination.")
'It appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that
Aikens had made out a prima facie case. When Aikens concluded his case
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion.
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a.

;
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... treating 'some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case,
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253.
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in
Burdine:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
450 U. S., at 256.
In short, the district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult.

•of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, supra, at 256. There is
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity.
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy.
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal
rules which were devised to govern "the allocation of burdens
and order of presentation of proof," id., at 252, in deciding
this ultimate question. The law often obliges finders of fact
to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord Justice
Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div.
459, 483 (1885).

The District Court erroneously thought that respondent
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question
of prima f acie case rather than directly on the question of discrimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evidence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated
against Aikens.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1044
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PETITIONER v. LOUIS H. AIKENS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et seq., claiming that petitioner, the United States Postal
Service, discriminated against him on account of his race.
Aikens, who is black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused to promote him to higher positions in
the Washington, D. C. Post Office where he had been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the Court
of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 2d 514 (CADC 1980). We vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). 453 U. S. 902
(1981).
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier
holding that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens
to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held
that the District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as
part of his primafacie case, that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 665 F. 2d
1057, 1058, 1059 (CADC 1981) (Per Curiam). We granted
certiorari. 1 - - U. S. - - (1982).
We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate
1
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The Postal Service argues that an employee who has
shown only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion
for which he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that
the employer selected a non-minority applicant has not established a "prima facie" case of employment discrimination
under Title VII. Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient
evidence that the Postal Service discriminated against him to
warrant a finding of a prima facie case. 2 Because this case
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily
evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. 3
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title
impact on minority applicants. See, e.g., Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252 n. 5 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 n. 14 (1973).
2
Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and
detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and 1974.
Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose management
abilities are far above average." App. 8. There was no derogatory or
negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more supervisory
seniority and training and development courses than all but one of the
white persons who were promoted above him. He has a Masters Degree
and has completed three years of residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had
substantially more education than the white employees who were advanced
ahead of him; of the 12, only two had any education beyond high school and
none had a college degree. He introduced testimony that the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the
District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would
be reversible error.
3
As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus, we agree with
the Court of Apeals that the District Court should not have required
Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 n. 44
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VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against" him. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,
254 (1981). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Burdine,
supra, at 255. In other words, the defendant must "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id., at 254.
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court
to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case,4 and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the fact finder must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10,
and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id., at 255. After Aikens presented his evidence to
the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's witnesses
testified that he was not promoted because he had turned
down several lateral transfers that would have broadened his
Postal Service experience. See Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325;
Pet. App. 53a. The District Court was then in a position to
decide the ultimate factual issue in the case.
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."
Burdine, supra, at 253. In other words, is "the employer
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination").
• It appears that at one point in the trial the District Court decided that
Aikens had made out a prima f acie case. When Aikens concluded his case
in chief, the Postal Service moved to dismiss on the ground that there was
no prima facie case. Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion.
Tr. 259. See Pet. App. 47a.
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. . . treating 'some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978), quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 355, n. 15 (1977). The prima facie
case method established in McDonnell Douglas was "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." Furnco, supra, at 577. Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if
the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case,
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The
district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff." Burdine, supra, at 253.
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed
questions of fact in other civil litigation. 5 As we stated in
Burdine:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [H]e
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
450 U. S., at 256.
In short, the district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult.
Of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "oportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," but rather a pretext. Burdine, supra, at 256. There is
no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such an opportunity.
5
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The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy.
There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should
they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal
rules which were devised to govern "the allocation of burdens
and order of presentation of proof," Burdine, supra, at 252,
in deciding this ultimate question. The law often obliges
finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. As
Lord Justice Bowen said in treating this problem in an action
for misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult
to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular
time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much as fact as
anything else." Eddington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div.
459, 483 (1885).
The District Court erroneously thought that respondent
was required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent, see n. 3, supra, and erroneously focused on the question
of prima facie case rather than directly on the question of discrimination. Thus we cannot be certain that its findings of
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the
District Court so that it may decide on the basis of the evidence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated
against Aikens.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment.
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